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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A FAMILY?
Marjorie Forlini and Sandra Rovira lived together for over
twelve years with their two sons from Rovira's previous marriage.
They considered themselves a family. In 1977, Forlini and Rovira
formalized their relationship by exchanging rings and vows in a cere-
mony before their friends and relatives. Though she had no biologi-
cal ties to their children, Forlini participated in their upbringing and
declared them as dependents on her tax returns. After Forlini's
death in 1988, Rovira sought surviving partner's benefits from For-
lini's employer. She was denied payment based on their lack of le-
* B.A., 1989, Yale University; J.D., 1992, New York University School of Law (ex-
pected). My gratitude goes to Professor Peggy Davis and Julie Novkov for reading and com-
menting on numerous drafts of this Note. Most of all, I would like to thank Sarah Chinn, who
worked to complete this project, and who completes my family.
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gaily-recognized ties.'
* Ninety-three-year-old Henry Pittman died in 1986, after sharing
an apartment for twenty-five years with Annette Baxter and her son
Jimmie Hendrix. Though at first Hendrix was only a boarder in
Pittman's home, he and his mother quickly began living as a family
with Pittman. Since neither was legally related to Pittman, upon his
death they faced eviction from their Harlem apartment. With the
help of the Legal Aid Society, they challenged their landlord in
court, where their household was held to have constituted a family
unit, based on Judge Alice Schlesinger's finding that their "relation-
ship developed into one of devoted concern, sharing, trust, loyalty
and love."2
0 Chris Florence, a twenty-three-year-old student in Lexington,
Kentucky, is a bisexual man who lives with his female lover of six
years and his male lover of three years. The group is open about the
relationships they share with each other, but report that their family
status is respected by neither their heterosexual peers nor the lesbian
and gay community in which they are active. Florence is legally
entitled to marry his female partner, but could not secure formal
recognition of his relationship with his male partner. He points out
that the legalization of gay marriage would not include legal protec-
tions for his family, since prohibitions against bigamy would still
prevent their joint union.3
a Edna Freimuth, Winnie Honsinger, and Austin Lederer live to-
gether with eleven other elderly people in a large home in Ridge-
wood, New Jersey. In order to insure privacy, each resident has her
own room within the household, though all share common kitchen
and recreational space. Members of the household care for one an-
other, and work together to take care of their home. Residents often
act as family members; some refer to other residents as "sisters."
Winnie Honsinger, an eighty-eight-year-old member of the house-
hold, explains: "we are a family; we are compatible and enjoy living
together."4
* Paul and Jane, sixty and sixty-four, respectively, live together in
a large frame house on the outskirts of a large suburban area.
Though the two have been partners for over seven years and have an
ongoing commitment to one another, they have never legally mar-
ried. This lack of legal status serves to deny the couple many privi-
1. Suit Over Death Benefits Asks, What Is a Family?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1990, at B7,
col. 3.
2. What Is a Family? Traditional Limits Are Being Redrawn, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989,
at Cl, col. 2.
3. Letter from Chris Florence, OUTWEEK: THE LESBIAN AND GAY NEWS MAGAZINE,
Mar. 20, 1991, at 6-7.
4. Five of Today's Families, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at C6, col. 1.
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leges accorded to wedded spouses, but both partners reject marriage
as a required institution for intimacy. They note that a marriage
license would add nothing to their commitment to one another.
Paul reports "[w]e always know we'll be together because we want to
be together and not because any law says we've got to be."'
Do these creative forms of relationships constitute families? In recent
years, defining what is meant by "the family" has become an increasingly ar-
duous process. Families have long been viewed as among the most essential
and universal units of society. This sense of the shared experience of family
has led to an often unexamined consensus regarding what exactly constitutes a
family. Thus, while "[w]e speak of families as though we all knew what fami-
lies are, ' we see no need to define the concepts embedded within the term.
The immediate connotation of the word "family" for most Americans
would probably be quite similar to the one that the National Pro-Family Coa-
lition adopted at the 1981 White House Conference on Families. The Coali-
tion's statement proposed that a family consists solely of "persons who are
related by blood, [heterosexual] marriage or adoption."7 Such a formulation
usually exemplifies the "traditional" notion of family. Regardless of whether
we accept this model as relevant to our own experience, its preeminence in
Western societies has been clearly established.'
The relatively universal recognition of a single normative conception of
the family, however, has not prevented alternative descriptions of the institu-
tion from gaining acceptance. For example, the American Home Economics
Association (AHEA) adopted a definition of family that explicitly rejects the
traditional formulation and instead offers the following definition: "two or
more individuals who share goals, resources and a commitment over a period
of time."9 The AHEA definition emphasizes its break with traditional inter-
pretations, noting that "[t]he family is that climate that one 'comes home to'
and it is this network of sharing and commitments that most accurately de-
scribes the family unit, regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption or marriage."' 0
5. P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK SEx 407-17
(1983).
6. R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (1971).
7. National Pro-Family Coalition on the White House Conference on Families, in NA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RESOURCE BOOK (1981). Although the Pro-Family Coalition does
not specify heterosexuality as a necessity for marriage, the adjective is included in brackets in
the definition because such a belief is implied in the statement.
8. F. ELLIOT, THE FAMILY: CHANGE OR CoNTINUTYr'? 4 (1986). Moreover, when dis-
cussing the "traditional family," many writers feel no need to define the term. See, eg., Note,
Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decislonmakingfor Unmarried Adults,
41 HASTINGS LJ. 1029 (1990). Likewise, the name "Pro-Family Coalition" itself suggests a
certain ideology, though there are no indices of political alignment in the title. See Langway,
Family Politics, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1980, at 78-79 (characterizing Pro-Family Coalition as
politically conservative).
9. AHEA adopted this definition in 1973. Diamond, Introduction, in FAMIUES, POLITICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMwiNST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE 1, 8 (1983).
10. Id
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1990-91] 1029
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
Many groups of individuals within the same household could be accu-
rately described by both of these formulations of family. It is nevertheless
interesting to examine the ways in which they overlap and differ. The Pro-
Family Coalition's definition excludes committed relationships established by
unmarried heterosexual partners and lesbian, gay, or bisexual 1 partners, as
well as any children in their relationships. 2 Also left out of the Pro-Family
Coalition's definition are "marriages" or commitments among more than two
adults and relationships between stepparents and stepchildren - even though
such individuals might very strongly identify themselves as being family mem-
bers of one another. 3 By the same token, people closely associated by blood
or marriage, such as parents of adult children, nephews or nieces, and so on,
might not be considered family members under the AHEA definition if they
do not sufficiently share their lives with one another or lack a conscious com-
mitment to each other.
Of course, these definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many
of the families recognized by the AHEA definition would fit within the Pro-
Family Coalition guidelines, and vice-versa. But neither of these rubrics on its
own incorporates every possible permutation of family, nor can any single for-
mulation of family fully explore the social conventions and complexities upon
which each is based. Each formulation uses the term "the family" without
acknowledging its multiplicity of possible meanings. Moreover, no current
definition recognizes the central distinction between "family" as a network of
kin - that is, members of a larger extended family related by blood and mar-
riage, also known as "family of origin" - and "family" as a nuclear unit, the
11. I include bisexual people in this category out of a recognition of bisexuality's unique
effect on family formation. Throughout this Note, however, I refer to heterosexual partners,
lesbian and gay partners, and members of multi-adult families (regardless of gender), without
specifically including recognition of the different experiences of bisexual men and women. I
intend these adjectives to describe the genders of the partners, rather than their sexual orienta-
tions; thus, the romantic/sexual relationships of bisexual people at any given point may be
included within one or more of the above descriptions. I do not wish to minimize the impor-
tance of bisexual orientation, but because this question does not directly impact on the legal
examination of alternative family definitions, discussion of the unique effect of bisexual orienta-
tion on family forms is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
12. Members of lesbian or gay partnerships often take responsibility for children who
either were consciously sought within those relationships or conceived within a prior heterosex-
ual relationship. A recent national survey reports that 21% of partners in lesbian couples and
9% of partners in gay couples care for children, and that members of one-third of all lesbian or
gay partnerships in which the adults are younger than 35 plan to have children at some point in
their lives. Partners' National Survey of Lesbian and Gay Couples, PARTNERS: THE NEWSLET-
TER FOR GAY & LESBIAN COUPLES, May-June 1990, at 10 (on file with author).
13. An ironic and probably unintended result of the Pro-Family Coalition definition is that
some persons who might expect to be considered unrelated might be considered "family" by
virtue of the limitlessness accorded blood, marriage, or adoptive ties. For example, the biologi-
cal parents of a child given up for adoption could be family to the newly adoptive parents
through the common child: the biological family is related by blood to the child, the child by
adoption to the other family, and both separate families to each other by "blood and adoption"
through the child.
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"family of procreation" or "family of choice." 4
Our general cultural notion of family arose in an era of little geographic
mobility, and thus included those of whom we thought as kin and among
whom we presumably lived. However, a shift in Western ideology has increas-
ingly focused on the ideal living situation as the traditional "nuclear" family:
two heterosexual married adult partners cohabiting with their biological or
adoptive children. This is reflected by the fact that several of the present defi-
nitions of family elide the concept of kinship as a form of family; thus, "fam-
ily" has in these instances come to indicate only "family of choice." The
existence of such definitions does not suggest that highly interactive relation-
ships between families of choice and families of origin do not exist. Kinship
networks often teach the social and cultural lessons that influence choices of
central family members and forms, and in turn, the family of origin often
shapes expectations of what kinship, partnership, parenthood, and other fam-
ily connections should and will be.
The failure to acknowledge these differing intentions adds to the confu-
sion around conflicting conceptions of family. For example, the Pro-Family
Coalition definition seems to focus on kinship. Within its guidelines, family
members include not only those in the nuclear family, but also grandparents,
aunts, uncles, sisters-in-law, and so on, implying a whole extended network of
relations. Moreover, the Pro-Family Coalition formulation makes no distinc-
tion among these relationships; thus, all ties based on blood, marriage, or
adoption appear to be equally significant throughout a person's lifespan. Con-
versely, the AHEA formula completely discounts the significance of kinship
ties; according to this definition and ones like it, independent adult children
might no longer be considered family members of the persons who raised
them.
Clearly, any of these approaches on its own omits family ties which many
people consider significant. This is probably not completely intentional. Per-
haps the Pro-Family Coalition meant only to define the limits of kinship, with
the expectation that such kin generally live together in nuclear units. It is
equally possible that AHEA intended its formulation to emphasize what it
considered to be the primary importance of individuals' families of choice,
with the understanding that kinship ties would not dissolve altogether, but
14. The terms "family of origin" and "family of procreation" were first introduced by
Murray Bowen in FAMILY THERAPY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1978). I use the term "family of
choice" rather than "family of procreation" in order to acknowledge that many contemporary
adult partnerships are formed for purposes other than procreation. However, I recognize that
not all family arrangements are freely chosen; in many cultures worldwide there exists a long
history of arranged marriages. For one example of a cross-cultural comparison of arranged
marriage, see PL BLOOD, JR., LOVE MATCH AND ARRANGED MARRIAGE: A ToKYo-DETRorT
COMPARISON (1967). Moreover, before recent changes in medical technology and societal
norms, the "choice" to beget children was almost never voluntary within these partnerships;
even now subtle and not-so-subtle social pressures encourage women to have children in order
to fulfill their presumed roles in society. See A. RICH, OF WoMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS
EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION (1976).
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rather take on less significance. Nevertheless, neither definition can embrace
completely the broad range of our cultural conceptions regarding what consti-
tutes a family.
This Note, while acknowledging the importance many of us continue to
attach to both social formations,15 will attempt to untangle and illuminate the
differences between the idea of kin and contemporary conceptualizations of
"family," that is, the nuclear family and its alternatives. An examination of
the morass created by the conflation of these two concepts serves to bring into
even sharper focus the fact that what constitutes "the family" has become a
hotly contested political issue, with the primary battleground being the family
of choice. Since this "central"16 family is the unit over which most debate
occurs, this Note will most closely examine those ties.1 7 The comparatively
voluntary nature of the formation of central families, as well as their primacy
as a culturally sanctioned unit, makes the family of choice the major site of
(potential) experimentation and redefinition of "the family."
Our cultural ideology assumes that everyone should live in some form of
nuclear family, and that the nuclear family is ideally suited to modem Ameri-
can society. Although this form of family has a long history, its primacy as an
ideological construct is relatively recent. However, the nuclear family as a
cultural ideal does not accurately reflect the reality of many families today, if
it ever did. II This disjunction between ideology and reality has fostered polit-
ical challenges to the desirability of the nuclear family.
When the law has dealt with the family, it has often shown deference to
conventional family ties. As the nuclear family gained preeminence, the law
incorporated it as the basic cultural norm. This integration has increasingly
come under fire as critiques of the nuclear family have developed. Moreover,
the institutionalization of the nuclear family has had a damaging effect upon
members of families whose relationships do not conform to this model, and
thus go unrecognized by the law.
Therefore this Note explores the possibility of incorporating truly alter-
native and pluralistic family definitions into the law. Rather than searching
15. Kinship itself can be an extremely complex concept. It incorporates a number of as-
sumptions meriting explanation. For example, for many individuals, networks of friendship
may be as vital and supportive as kin networks. As much work must be done to demystify
kinship as to demistify the family of choice, although such an endeavor exceeds the limits of this
Note.
16. I use the term "central" here and elsewhere when I use "family of choice" to distin-
guish it from the nuclear family model. The term "nuclear family" will be used to refer more to
the ideology of a particular type of central family: married partners of opposite sexes and their
children. In many cases, central families may greatly resemble the ideal of the nuclear family,
or be directly analogous to the model - such is the case in families consisting of unmarried
heterosexual adult partners or same sex couples. In other situations, however, central families
may be composed quite differently.
17. That is, while the importance of extended or tenuous family ties is a disputed point,
how such bonds should be described has not received much attention in the ongoing contro-
versy over the definition of family.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 68-103.
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for potential statutory changes, we must start by asking how we could re-
invent a means of including multiple non-traditional family definitions in law
if we were not constrained by current social and political reality, and if we
were not limited by traditional conceptions of both the law and the family.
This Note seeks to move in the direction of individually- or family-initiated
definition of relationships, and away from formulations of family imposed by
the state.
Part I examines the ways in which the ideology of the nuclear family
gained preeminence. It also investigates the challenges to the primacy of the
nuclear family by political and social movements for change. Part II discusses
the effect that this unitary definition has on current family law and the relation
of other family forms to the legal model. It evaluates the judicial expansion of
legal definitions of family in case law, as well as proposed changes in current
schemes offered by legal scholars. Finally, Part Ill explores possible means of
introducing a much-needed sense of plurality of family forms within the law
and discusses the ramifications of such a proposal. I do not wish to establish a
single concrete plan in this area. To do so at this stage might serve to limit
dialogue regardihg potential approaches to incorporating recognition of a di-
versity of family forms. Instead, my purpose is to expand and encourage a
discourse that can establish our ultimate societal goals, from which we can
then begin to envision concrete solutions.
I.
THE NUCLEAR FAMILY AND ITS CRITics
The "traditional" nuclear family as a sociological construct was a well-
studied institution in early modem sociology. The work of Bronislaw Mali-
nowski and Talcott Parsons, among others, established a body of theory re-
garding the nuclear family and its evolution. In recent years, these
understandings of the nuclear family have come under attack by feminists and
other thinkers. Both in theoretical writings and in the law, a recognition of
pluralistic and alternative forms of family has begun to develop.
A. The Primacy of the Nuclear Family
How did the traditional nuclear family achieve such prominence? An-
swers to this question can be found both in the increasing influence of socio-
logical explanations of the family beginning in the late nineteenth century and
in the changes in family systems over the past one hundred years. Much of
the development of family theory originated in the growth of sociology as an
academic discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 9
19. See, eg., Collier, Rosaldo & Yanagisako, Is There a Family? New Anthropological
Views, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 25, 29-33 (1982); see also
Linton, The Natural History of the Family, in THE FAMILY: ITs FUNCTION AND DESTINY 18
(1949). For the sake of clarity, the schematized history of family theory which follows elides
the complex interactions among theoretical movements. While this discussion comprises a lin-
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Many germinal social theorists relied heavily on the work of anthropologist
Bronislaw Malinowski, who regarded the family as "the foundation of human
society. ' '20 Malinowski relied on the "principle of legitimacy" to support his
contention that the nuclear family was essentially universal for "healthy" soci-
eties.21 He argued that since human children require a long period of caretak-
ing from adults, each child needs an identifiable mother and father to claim as
nurturers.22 In order to serve this goal, women and men became aligned in
permanent pairs so they could determine the paternity of offspring; in this
way, the community could identify which adults were responsible for the care
of particular children. These groups then formed affectional ties and became,
inevitably, families.23 Malinowski presumed that societies in which the nu-
clear family was not the norm were either insufficiently developed or in the
process of decay.24
Not all early social thinkers agreed that the nuclear family was the most
socially desirable form. Socialist theorists such as Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels challenged the naturalized "bourgeois" nuclear family. Marx and En-
gels postulated that family forms grew out of changing historical realities.
Specifically, they argued that changes in the distribution of property within
social systems led to the establishment of certain family models.25 Moreover,
according to Marx and Engels, the nuclear family was designed not to fulfill
emotional or material needs but to satisfy the requirements of capitalist pro-
duction: it would protect private property by enforcing monogamy, which
would ensure that the paternity of children could be established, and thus
would allow property to be transferred intergenerationally. Engels later re-
fined and expanded upon this theory, tracing the emergence of four distinct
family forms over the course of millennia and maintaining that each developed
out of the last according to shifting patterns of property relations.26 Unlike
ear narrative of trends in sociological thought, other elements, such as prevailing historical,
moral, and social forces, as well as prior and concurrent social theories, greatly influenced each
theorist's work.
20. Keller, Does the Family Have a Future?, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION: RETHINKING
MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, CHILD REARING, AND FAMILY ORGANIZATION 520 (A. Skolnick &
J. Skolnick 5th ed. 1986) [hereinafter FAMILY IN TRANSITION] (quoting a debate between Mali-
nowski and Robert Briffault broadcast by the B.B.C.).
21. See Malinowski, Parenthood, the Basis of the Social Order, in THE NEW GENERATION:
THE INTIMATE PROBLEMS OF MODERN PARENTS AND CHILDREN 113 (1930).
22. B. MALINOWSKI, A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF CULTURE 91-119 (1944).
23. Skolnick & Skolnick, Introduction: Family in Transition, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION,
supra note 20, at 8-9.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
473, 473-76 (R. Tucker ed. 1978) (English ed. 1888).
26. F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 44-
88 (1884 rpt. Pathfinder Press 1988). Engels uses the term "consanguine" to describe families
in which sexual partnerships are arranged non-exclusively along generational lines: all mothers
and fathers within a family are equal spouses to each other and are parents to all children within
the family. All children are siblings and also spouses to each other. In the punaluan family,
inter-"sibling" partnerships are prohibited. Moreover, only the children of a mother's sisters
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Malinowski, Engels viewed the monogamous nuclear family as having evolved
over time, and conceived of it as a socially constructed rather than a naturally
occurring phenomenon, mutable in accord with alterations in the surrounding
society.27
Engels' argument that the nuclear family was a relatively recent historical
development set the stage for later sociological work, which came to view the
nuclear family as arising contemporaneously with the industrial revolution.
Like Engels, later sociologists noted that the composition of the central family
unit changed over time, though they did not necessarily view such changes as
determined by systems of property relations. Unlike Engels, however, many
early twentieth-century social theorists still considered the nuclear family a
universally desirable form and feared for its survival in the face of progress
toward a technologically advanced society.'
Generally, these theorists offered the nuclear family as the social norm
for modem Western cultures and traced the development of this structure
from its roots in the previously dominant extended family. According to this
construction, economic survival within the agrarian cultures most common to
Western societies prior to the nineteenth century depended upon an institu-
tionalized extended family network.29  This theory rests on the premise that
only a moderately-sized intergenerational group in which members bonded to
one another by interdependence and kin loyalty could carry out all of the tasks
necessary for self-sufficiency in a subsistence economy. In such a society, most
necessary work took place in the household.31 Children were needed help-
mates, rather than social and financial burdens. The larger family group was
somewhat self-contained, providing education, spiritual development, and
emotional expression in addition to corporal maintenance.
31
Some theorists argued that the industrial revolution, with its associated
advancement in technology and trend toward urbanized individual factory la-
bor, resulted in a transition from extended families to the nuclear family as the
and of a father's brothers are those parents' "children:" cross-gendered siblings* children are
simply nephews and nieces and available spouses for their cousins. The pairing family estab-
lishes serial monogamy among sexual partners, and a widening circle of relatives is excluded
from such partnerships. Children "belong" solely to their mother and thus are only siblings
with their mother's other children. Finally, the monogamian family establishes (at least for the
female partner) a sexually exclusive, insoluble sexual partnership between two individuals,
whose only children are those which come out of their union. Intra-family sexual relations are
forbidden either across or between generations.
27. Note that while these formulations of family could embrace myriad relationships,
Marx and Engels saw heterosexuality and procreation as essential to the central family and as
"naturally" occurring within the sanctioned family.
28. Skolnick & Skolnick, supra note 23, at 13.
29. See, eg., J. SHAFFER, FAMILY AND FARM: AGRARIAN CHANGE AND HousEHoLD
ORGANIZATION IN THE LoIRE VALLEY, 1500-1900, at 4-12 (1982) (system of land-tenure ne-
cessitates the joint family system).
30. Hareven, American Families in Transition: Historical Perspectives on Change, in FAM-
ILY IN TRANsITIoN, supra note 20, at 44.
31. Id. at 44-45.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1990-91] 1035
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
norm.32 The advent of industrialization promoted the exchange of labor for
wages and reduced the need for each unit to be self-supporting. Such individ-
ualized work did not require large family units.3" Therefore, according to this
theory, the nuclear family resulted at least in part from this breakdown of the
more attenuated family ties. These observers feared the eventual disintegra-
tion of the nuclear family as continued economic progress undermined the
importance of kinship.34
However, the advent of the "functionalist" school of family theory in the
1940s brought about a massive surge of optimism regarding the nuclear fam-
ily. The functionalist school assumed that systems of human relations existed
in a society because over time they had adapted to the society's needs. 35 Thus
an explanation of how a social institution worked also constituted a justifica-
tion for its superiority. An important component of this idea was the supposi-
tion that in any given historical period, the dominant family system was
uniquely adapted to other social forces; each system gave way to the next
variation only if it better suited the emerging social conditions.36 This depic-
tion of the evolution of family structure primarily found support in the work
of nineteenth-century researchers whose theories emanated from Social Dar-
winism.3 7 These writers present the nuclear family as the natural victor over
competing forces during the change to a technological society. The idea of
family structures battling for survival solidified the sense that "the family," in
whatever form it existed, was an effective, systematized phenomenon.38
The most influential proponent of the functional theory of the modem
family was Talcott Parsons. Parsons based his views regarding the inevitabil-
ity of the contemporary nuclear family on the gender-specific differentiated
roles assigned to each member.39 Parsons agreed with his contemporaries that
the nuclear family evolved from loose extended-family households concur-
rently with the rise of industry. He refined this theory, however, by describing
32. M. GORDON, THE NUCLEAR FAMILY IN CRISIS: THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNA-
TIVE 2 (1972) (explaining and critiquing this construction).
33. Hareven, supra note 30, at 44-46.
34. Collier, Rosaldo & Yanagisako, supra note 19, at 30 (noting "these writers... shared a
sense of moral emptiness and a fear of instability and loss"); see also Hareven, supra note 30, at
40; Skolnick & Skolnick, supra note 23, at 13.
35. F. ELLIOT, supra note 8, at 9.
36. Some theorists have also posited that the purposes such family structures served for
their members differ among temporal periods. See the discussion of the work of E. Burgess, H.
Locke, and M. Thomes in id. at 38.
37. Collier, Rosaldo & Yanagisako, supra note 19, at 30 (describing the social philosophy
of Herbert Spencer).
38. See, e.g., Murdock, The Universality of the Nuclear Family, in A MODERN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE FAMILY 44 (1968) (presenting the nuclear family as effective because, for example,
although "agencies" may share in the fulfillment of the functions of the family, they have never
supplanted it).
39. See generally T. PARSONS & R. BALES, FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION
PROCESS (1955).
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a shift over time in the purpose of the family.' He noted that family networks
historically depended upon each member's labor for survival. Mutual reliance
of family members for both emotional and physical support placed intragroup
cooperation and loyalty at a premium. Parsons contended that the shift from
self-sustaining kinship groups caused by the post-industrial separation of work
and home required those in the modem labor force to enter a work world
governed by merit and competition. Instead of completely enclosing family
members, the home took on different functions: to rear children and prepare
them to enter the harsh exterior world and to nurture those adults already
engaged in the industrial work force. As the family's primary function be-
came the emotional support of its members, the size of the unit shrunk. Si-
multaneously, other kinship ties became less important and more attenuated. 1
Parsons further explained that men and women in modem families
adopted differentiated roles in order to complete this transformation of the
family into a specialized unit.42 Parsons argued that the "task-oriented small
group" was directly analogous to a nuclear family, and speculated that the
adult partners took on certain roles in order to meet these same needs. Hence
the wife assumed the "expressive '" 43 role" while the husband assumed the in-
strumental role. Parsons maintained that this split was part of a general trend
toward a more differentiated society and contended that the differentiation of
roles played a functional purpose by increasing efficiency. According to this
theory, the nuclear family was a complete and integrated system, with each
member dependent upon the others for the maintenance of the family and
each contributing essential elements to the system.
Parsons' theories represented a watershed in the growing field of family
study. Parsons successfully integrated into a single theory the various strands
of previous sociological work on the family. Although shaped by historical
conditions, the family, according to Parsons' theory, would not disappear with
40. Parsons, The American Family: Its Relations to Personality and to the Social Structure,
in id. at 3-9.
41. See generally id. at 3-33.
42. Parsons based his theories on the work of experimenters who showed that in small,
task-oriented groups (composed of male Harvard students) a process of differentiation occurs
such that two separate leadership roles emerge to serve the needs of the group as well as the
needs of the task. One person in the group tends to become a "task" leader, and another person
to become a "social/emotional" leader. Bales & Slater, Role Differentiation in Small Decision-
Making Groups, in T. PARSONS & R. BALES, supra note 39, at 259. The instrumental leader
focuses on making sure the task gets done while the social/emotional leader focuses on ensuring
that the emotional needs of the group members are met. Id. at 297-99; see also F. ELLIOT, supra
note 8, at 34-39; Zelditch, Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family: A Comparative Study, in
id. at 307-51.
43. Parsons chose to use the term "expressive" rather than Bales and Slater's term "social/
emotional," though each referred to the same set of characteristics.
44. Parsons offered no explanation for his assumption that seeing to the emotional needs of
the family was a "female" task, nor for his assumption that wage-earning was a "male" job. He
seemed simply to have assumed that this was a "natural" division based on the differences
between the genders, most notably the women's childbearing function. See Parsons, supra note
40, at 23.
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the demise of agricultural society. Rather the family would adapt to modem
conditions and remain as the efficient basis of modern industrial society. The
modem nuclear family, in particular, can, according to Parsons, be seen as an
inevitable result of factors unique to the earlier part of this century.4"
B. Criticisms of Traditional Theory
When first published, Parsons' work on the family was almost universally
acclaimed for its coherent and carefully outlined theory. Indeed, Parsons re-
mains a commanding figure in the sociology of the contemporary Western
family; his work is currently regarded as the fundamental articulation of mod-
em conservative family theory.46 However, many of his constructs have been
disputed, and few contemporary sociologists subscribe to his theories in their
entirety.47
Parsons' theories have provoked an array of criticisms, which fall into
three loose categories. The first of these criticisms notes that Parsons' charac-
terization of the development of family forms reflects an idealized vision of
simultaneous technological and societal "progress" which is not historically
accurate. Given the variety of potential family systems, the cultural choice of
one form as dominant is not historically inevitable but socially dictated. Sec-
ond, progressive and feminist critics argue that the family is not a value-neu-
tral product of human relations, whose sole function is to fulfill social needs,
but "an ideological construct with moral implications. ' 4 Third, recent social
movements and historical developments have led to radically changed under-
standings of the structure and role of family in society. Contemporary family
theorists, building upon feminist demystification of the ideological nature of
"the family," point out the dissonance between the normalization of the nu-
clear family and the lived experiences of "family" for a large number of Amer-
icans. Closer examination of these three challenges to Parsons reveals their
power not only as academic arguments but also as vehicles toward a more
sophisticated understanding of current realities of family life.
The normative critique of Parsons' theory focuses on his insistence that a
single kind of industrialized social development led to a single kind of nuclear
family in all healthy "advanced" societies, and the related generalization that
nuclear families arose only as a result of industrialization. Both of these asser-
tions have proven inaccurate. The first influential proponent of this criticism,
Peter Laslett, offers evidence that in the agrarian social structure of sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century England, only about ten percent of households con-
tained family members outside of nuclear family relationships. 49 This finding
45. Parsons, The Normal American Family, in FARBER, MUSTACCHI & WILSON, MAN
AND CIVILIZATION: THE FAMILY'S SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL 31 (1965).
46. See F. ELLIOT, supra note 8, at 34.
47. Id. at 35.
48. Collier, Rosaldo & Yanagisako, supra note 19, at 37.
49. Laslett, Mean Household Size in England Since the Sixteenth Century, in HOUSEHOLD
AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 125 (1972).
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casts doubt on Parsons' description of the unique suitability of the nuclear
family to industrialized society. Moreover, cross-cultural research demon-
strates that significant variations exist in family patterns among modem indus-
trialized societies. Historical studies in both Western and Asian societies
reveal strong ties between specific societies' values and construction of family
in their historical past and the equivalent values and structures in the pres-
ent." In fact, many scholars now argue that it is impossible to identify one
specific family form common to all industrialized societies. Rather, they con-
tend that each culture develops its own kind of family based in part upon its
own past, traditions, and values.51 Moreover, within any given culture a vari-
ety of family forms can exist simultaneously. Of course, social upheavals such
as industrialization altered and reshaped the family, but the nature of these
changes was conditioned by the particulars of extant cultural values.5
While this first set of critics questions Parsons' belief in the inevitability
of the nuclear family, few challenged the implicit value systems upon which
the nuclear family itself is based. With the rise of the second wave of feminism
in the late 1960s, however, came an explicit critique of the Western nuclear
family,53 as well as of Parsons' explication of its roots and functions. For the
most part, current feminism not only has refuted Parsons' theory of the origin
of the nuclear family, it has also challenged the nomination of heterosexual
marriage and childrearing as an ideal, or even workable, social system.
Of course, feminist thought is not uniform. Indeed, there are striking
divergences within feminist theory, including a wide sweep of political and
social affinities which range from radical to relatively liberal to self-con-
sciously conservative work, and include theories based on the unique exper-
iences of women of color, the perspective of lesbian separatism, and the
premises of Marxism, socialism, and other social visions.' While not all femi-
50. For example, the somewhat loose kinship priorities of modem White Anglo-Saxon
American Protestants can be traced back to kinship values among Puritans in the seventeenth-
century American colonies. M. GoRDoN, supra note 32, at 3-6. Similarly, some theorists have
argued that the tendency of the modem Japanese family toward collectivist values and strong
extended kinship bonds has its origins in feudal Japanese society. See F. ELLIOT, supra note 8,
at 39.
51. See, e1g., W. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILY PATTERNs (1963).
52. See A. MACFARLANE, THE OIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY,
PROPERTY AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1979).
53. Note that the American feminist critique of the family did not begin in the 1960% but
rather emerged from women's activism beginning in the late nineteenth century. See generally
THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR (1973). Much of the "woman's
movement" of the post-Civil War era focused on the inequalities inherent in marriage and the
heterosexual family. C. GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC
RELATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1898); see also
Clark, Matrimonial Bonds. Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAWv &
HIsT. REV. 25 (1990). However, the nineteenth-century feminist movement was primarily or-
ganized around achieving women's suffrage not restructuring gender relations. Thus, when
suffrage was granted, a political anticlimax caused feminism to decline. M. RYAN, WOMAN-
HOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO PRESENT 217-20 (1983).
54. Many radical feminists hold that male dominance is the primary source of all social
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nists have agreed on the current system's origins or on ideal alternatives,5
most are dissatisfied with the present family system as well as with the way in
which the social sciences compress a variety of family structures into one
model. Fundamental to the feminist movement are the beliefs that the com-
pulsory nature of the nuclear family and the traditional roles which are as-
sumed to operate within it oppress and limit both women and men, and that
we may reshape "the family" in ways which reflect feminist values and human
realities.
Barrie Thorne, a leading feminist theorist, identifies five major themes
within the feminist rethinking of the sociology of the family to support her
contention that "feminists have challenged beliefs that any specific family ar-
rangement is natural, biological or 'functional' in a timeless way."5 6 Thorne's
summary provides a concise reading of the interwoven threads of feminist dis-
course(s) around family theory:
5 7
1. Feminists . ..have argued against the ideology of "the
monolithic family," which elevates the contemporary nuclear family
with a breadwinner husband and full-time wife and mother as the
only natural and legitimate family form .... 1s
2. Feminists have sought to reclaim the family - including
inequality, and that society, as well as the family, has to be completely restructured to achieve
parity. Liberal feminists tend to locate women's oppression in laws and other social constructs
such as educational and vocational barriers, presumed family obligations, and learned patterns
of behavior in both women and men which serve to reinforce traditional notions, all of which
act to prevent women from achieving parity with men. Such liberal thinkers maintain that
when legal and societal barriers to women's equality are removed, gender parity will assume its
rightful position as the social norm. For a thorough discussion of different forms of feminist
thought, see A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); A. JAGOAR & P.
ROTHENBERG, FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter FEMINIST
FRAMEWORKS].
55. For example, Shulamith Firestone roots male dominance in biology: "[t]he heart of a
woman's oppression is her childbearing and childrearing roles." S. FIRESTONE, THE DIALEC-
TIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR A FEMINIST REVOLUTION 81 (1970). These roles have forced
women to accept permanently reduced mobility and ties to home and children. The only path
toward liberation, Firestone maintains, is for women to reject biologically-assigned roles, and
male dominance, and to form women-only communities. On the other hand, liberal feminists
such as Caroline Bird locate the beginnings of patriarchy in the distribution of power within
political systems: once power is fairly distributed, inequality between men and women will
disappear. C. BIRD & S. BRILLER, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN
DOWN 186-87 (1968).
56. Thorne, Feminist Rethinking of the Family: An Overview, in RETHINKING THE FAM-
ILY, supra note 19, at 2.
57. The following quotation in text, from Thorne, supra note 56, at 2-3, is embellished
with my own references to relevant literature.
58. See K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 45-49 (1969). Millett sees the family as "Patri-
archy's chief institution," id. at 45, and its reproductions of gender-specific roles as vehicles for
the perpetuation of male dominance. Susan Johnson's study of long-term lesbian couples ex-
plicitly suggests that alternative family systems can act as "positive role models" to present
more "humane and livable" forms of family structures. S. JOHNSON, STAYING POWER: LONG
TERM LESBIAN COUPLES 16 (1990).
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topics such as the sexual division of labor,59 heterosexuality,60 male
dominance,6 and motherhood6' - for social and historical analysis
3 . .. Feminists have explored the differentiation of family
experience mystified by the glorification of motherhood,' love, and
images of the family as a domestic haven .... 64
4. Feminists have raised questions about family boundaries
.... This line of analysis challenges a series of dichotomies - pri-
vate and public, family and society - that are often taken for
granted.
65
5.... [Feminists have explored] the degree to which the divi-
sion between market-based individualism and family-based nur-
turance is ideological or factual, and its consequences and possible
solutions.
59. Among the first examples of this in the United States is Betty Friedan's The Feminine
Mystique. Friedan argued that middle-class American women living in the post-World War II
era accepted that their only true calling and fulfillment lay in their potential roles as wives and
mothers; such women felt (and to a great extent were) banned from the world of work outside
the home. B. FRiEDAN, THE FE iNnE MYSTIQUE 41 (1963).
60. See Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in PoWERs OF DEsIRE-
THE POLITICS OF SExuALITY 177 (1983); see also J. BosvELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLEiR-
ANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF
Tm CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980). Both works examine the pre-
dominance and presumption of heterosexuality in Western culture and critique theoretical in-
abilities to address the special situation of lesbians and gay men.
61. See A. DwoRKIN, WoMiAN HATING (1974). Dworkin holds that "[t]he commitment
to ending male dominance as the fundamental psychological, political and cultural reality of
earth-lived life is the fundamental revolutionary commitment. It is a commitment to transfor-
mation of the self and transformation of the social reality on every level." Id. at 17.
62. See N. CHODORO-w, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE SocIoLoGy OF GENDER (1978) (challenging the Freudian notion that "anatomy is
destiny" and instead postulating that female motherhood is a soecially/psychically self-perpetu-
ating structure which can be altered).
63. See Shulman, A Marriage Agreement, I Up FROM UNDER 5 (Fall 1970), in which
Shulman questions the "glory" of motherhood in the context of the work involved in parenting.
She notes: "Children make unbelievable messes .... But even more burdensome than the physi-
cal work of childrearing was the relentless responsibility I had for the children .... As the
children grew up, our domestic arrangement seemed increasingly odious to me." Id. at 5-6.
64. One basis for this criticism is the argument that "family life!' is the locus of women's
labor, not women's leisure. Since housework is inequitably divided between women and men,
"coming home" does not provide women with a sense of relaxation, but simply with a resump-
tion of household duties. Women's work has continued to grow in recent times, in which a
larger percentage of women work both inside and outside the home. Berheide found that wo-
men did between 72% and 94% of household tasks; Berk and Berk conjecture that "employed
wives hold down two full-time jobs" by working for wages and performing housework.
Berheide, Women's Work in the Home: Seems Like Old Times, in WoMEN AND THE FAMILY:
Two DECADES OF CHANGE 37 (1984); R. BERK & S. BERK, LABOR AND LEISURE AT HOME
231 (1979).
65. These issues relate closely to the theories stated above: the definitions of public and
private spheres are played out in arenas such as housework, heterosexual marriage, and
motherhood.
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Thome's synopsis represents almost twenty years of feminist thought
about the family and relations between the sexes. However, these analyses did
not emerge, fully formed, from the minds of feminist theorists over the course
of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Instead, the imposition of this kind of scrutiny
on human and gender relations emanated from the interactions between devel-
oping feminist theories and other social movements that challenged and solidi-
fied feminist ideology and practice. All of these were part of a massive shift in
public political discourse, from an ideology of sameness and conformity to a
politics of difference and change." Thus, the increasingly popular acceptance
of basic feminist ideas led many middle class (and previously apolitical) wo-
men to feel trapped within the nuclear family.67
Concurrent with the rise of feminism, society's attitudes toward sex, mar-
riage, divorce, homosexuality, and collectivism changed. These transforma-
tions affected understandings of the family with respect to structure as well as
function. In terms of reconfigurations in family structure, the most significant
of the social change movements intersecting with feminism was the so-called
"sexual revolution" of the late 1960s to mid 1970s. This phenomenon (or
combination of phenomena) radically altered cultural perceptions of sexuality
from a totally "private" domain to a topic of increasing public preoccupation.
One formative element of this "revolution," the introduction of the birth con-
trol pill in 1960 and its subsequent popularity, allowed women a semblance of
freedom from unwanted pregnancy.68 This new technology gave women the
option of supposedly worry-free sex; the changes in sexual mores also made it
(theoretically) guilt-free and plentiful.
This principle of sex without anxiety for both women and men was the
cornerstone of the growing sexual freedom of the 1960s, culminating in the
"free love" and "sexual anarchy" movements of the hippies.69 Feminism also
initially espoused "sexual liberation, ' ' 70 seeing in it a release from the double
standard of female passivity and male aggression that had previously marked
66. For example, during the 1960s women were deeply involved in public political move-
ments for social change, particularly the civil rights, New Left, and antiwar movements. M.
RYAN, supra note 53, at 310-11. Despite (or perhaps because of) their participation, many
women within these movements realized that they were denied the equality that they demanded
for others, often by their (male) fellow activists. J. D'EMILIO & E. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATrERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 310-11 (1988). Thus, they took the polit-
ical tools they had learned and applied them to their own oppression as women. See L. SAR-
GENT, WOMEN AND REVOLUTION (1981); see also M. RYAN, supra note 53, at 310-12 (tracing
the growth of one wing of the feminist movement as a protest against misogyny within the civil
rights movement and the New Left).
67. See Friedan, Twenty Years After and Introduction to the Tenth Anniversary Edition, in
B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE: TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY EDITION, 5 (1983).
68. See J. D'EMILIO & E. FREEDMAN, supra note 66, at 309.
69. Id. at 307.
70. Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the sexual revolution was by no
means as revolutionary as it claimed. Feminists charged that "sexual freedom in contemporary
America had become 'the right that is a duty.'" Id. at 312. The desire to escape from repres-
sion became a new pressure to have sex all the time.
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heterosexual interactions. This kind of sexual experimentation was not lim-
ited to those who saw themselves on the margins of, or rebelling against, soci-
ety. The gradual disjunction between sex and marriage affected every level of
society: marriage was no longer either inevitable or necessarily permanent,
since sex was more freely available both before and outside of the matrimonial
bond.
Not only were sex and marriage gradually becoming disentangled; the
same was increasingly true of sex and heterosexuality. Inspired in part by the
feminist critiques of heterosexual marriage and emboldened by movements for
sexual freedom, lesbians and gay men began to join together socially and polit-
ically to form the new gay rights movement.71 The increasingly high profile of
organizations such as the Gay Liberation Front, Radicalesbians, and the Gay
Activists Alliance, as well as the gradual "normalization" of discussions of
homosexuality, led many people to rethink their sexual orientation.' More-
over, some individuals who had entered into straight marriages to hide or
"cure" their homosexuality were motivated to sever their heterosexual rela-
tionships and enter the growing lesbian and gay community.' 3
As a partial result of these social upheavals, the 1970s brought about a
tremendous increase in the divorce rate. Researchers claim that during the
1970s and 1980s almost half of all marriages in the United States ended with
divorce,7 4 compared to a significantly lower rate two decades before.7" That
increase has heralded a number of changes both in attitudes toward family
roles and actual family structures.
Primarily, the growing divorce rate has had several predictable, concrete
results. First, the rising rate of divorce has led to a proportionate increase in
newly-single people;76 whereas unmarried adults had previously been a small
minority, suddenly large numbers of persons who had expected to be bonded
"until death do us part" found themselves separated much sooner." Further
71. Id. at 320-21.
72. See generally B. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MovEbiENT 75-101
(1987); L. HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE CLOSETS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HoMosEXUAL LIBERA-
TION 1-12 (1972) (describing the rise of the gay rights movement).
73. See, eg., Baetz, I See My First Lesbian, in THE LESBIAN PATH 3 (M. Cruikshank ed.
1985) (personal narrative).
74. Martin, Two Cheers for the Moral Majority, in FAMILY RELATIONS 470 (1988). Not
all studies agree with these figures, but in general researchers agree that the rise in divorce rates
over the past twenty years has been enormous. See W. BEER, RELATIVE STRANOEM: STUDIES
OF STEPFAMILY PROCEssES ix (1988); F. ELLIOT, supra note 8, at 149.
75. In 1965, the divorce rate was 2.5 per 100 population. National Center for Health
Statistics, Birth, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths for 1979, 28 MONTHLY VrrAL STATIsriCS
REPORT 12 (1980).
76. Such a transition often requires tremendous readjustment. Single adults have many of
the same responsibilities and concerns as married people, but deal with these issues quite differ-
ently. Stein, The Diverse World of Single Adults, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN A CHANGING
SocIETY 63 (1989) [hereinafter MARRIAGE AND FAMILY].
77. Additionally, the growing acceptance of single status may have led more and more
adults to delay or even forgo marriage. Since 1970, the proportion of women and men who
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complications existed for individuals with children, who were not only single
but also single parents.78 Thus divorce, followed by remarriage, often has cre-
ated blended families that include children from prior unions. While remar-
riage after the death of a spouse had occasionally created blended families in
the past, the increased number of individuals with children seeking remarriage
after a divorce has greatly normalized this previously unusual family struc-
ture. New families of husbands, wives, ex-husbands, ex-wives, step-children,
half-siblings, and other variations on this theme have exploded the previously
uniform membership of the nuclear family.79
With these basic changes in demographics came a deeper transformation
in cultural beliefs about marriage and the previously hegemonic roles marriage
required. Many newly divorced women, often not having previously worked
outside the home, have had to learn to support themselves financially. This
has been especially true for women who were awarded custody of their chil-
dren. Although ex-husbands generally have been required to pay alimony and
child support for children under the age of eighteen living with their mothers,
the break-up of a marriage still frequently results in a drastic reduction of the
woman's standard of living. 0 The increase in the number of female-headed
single parent families, in combination with increasing awareness of feminist
ideology, has led to a change in attitude regarding women's financial indepen-
dence both within and outside marriage. Even those women who create
"traditional" nuclear families, in which their household labor is exchanged for
economic support by their husbands, cannot be certain that they will not in
the future have to enter the marketplace for employment. Women have had to
learn to conceive of themselves as economically viable. Today, more women
retain jobs after they marry, in part to bring money into the home and to
guarantee financial stability in the case of divorce, but also in significant part
to achieve the sense of fulfillment and independence long associated with ca-
reer ambitions."1 Thus men are no longer uniformly regarded as the sole
breadwinners, a reality which subtly alters the balance of power within
marriages.
These changes have led to the disruption of established family forms. As
the divorce rate rose, many individuals rejected heterosexual paired marriage
altogether, having lost faith in its supposed stability. In the aftermath of di-
have never married has almost doubled; currently, over 37% of all men and 43% of all women
have never married. Id. at 63-64.
78. During the 1970s, the number of single parents grew by an astonishing 82%. Only
One U.S. Family in Four is "Traditional". N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at A19, col. 1. By 1985,
an estimated 12 million American children lived with a single parent. Martin, supra note 74, at
470.
79. W. BEER, supra note 74, at ix-x (noting that 75% of all divorced persons remarry, and
50% of those persons have children under the age of 18).
80. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution and the Feminization of Poverty, in MARRIAGE
AND FAMILY, supra note 76, at 468.
81. Sokoloff, Motherwork and Working Mothers, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS, supra note
54, at 262.
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vorce, many people chose to cohabit with new sexual partners without em-
barking on a new marriage. Beginning in the early 1970s, the number of
young couples who chose to live together without marrying increased rap-
idly.82 Some researchers observed that many couples entered these living ar-
rangements as a kind of "practice" marriage that facilitated acquiring skills
needed to establish a household with a permanent partner in the future."
Other couples viewed their cohabitation as a specific attempt to rebel against
the institutionalized, married nuclear family, while a smaller number saw the
arrangement as a temporary convenience.8 Overall, cohabitation has become
firmly established as a viable family arrangement apart from heterosexual
marriage.
A related form of alternative family is the "group marriage." Unlike dy-
adic marriages, a group marriage comprises three or more individuals and is
characterized by an intention to form permanent, bonded, partnership-type
relationships among all of the adults.8 5 Group marriages have been patterned
quite closely after existing marriage relationships; they emphasize sexual and
interpersonal intimacy within the group8 6 combined with collective living and
child rearing.
87
The commune movement manifested the most radical split from the nu-
clear family model. Communal living, both urban and rural, rejected notions
of private property, marriage, and parental privilege, while embracing princi-
ples of co-operative living and work.88 These communes were formed by vary-
ing sized groups of individuals who were not necessarily related by blood,
marriage, or adoption, but who intended to act as family members to one an-
other 9 and as joint parents to children living in the community." While vari-
82. Census data indicate that between 1970 and 1986, the number of unmarried couples
cohabiting more than quadrupled, rising from 523,000 to well over Z,00,000. Jackson, Living
Together Unmarried, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, supra note 76, at 73-74.
83. See Bloch, Unwed Couples, 132 REDBOOK 140-44 (1969); see also Macklin, Non-
marital Heterosexual Cohabitation: An Overview, in CONTMipORARY FAMbuLI AND ALTER-
NATIVE LIFEsrYLEs: HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH AND THEORY 49 (1983).
84. Researchers saw these attitudinal divisions as predicated on gender. They noted that it
was much more likely for men to view the arrangement in pragmatic terms while women see it
as the beginning of a pattern moving toward increasingly stable and long-term relationships.
Lyness, Lipetz & Davis, Living Together. An Alternative to Marriage, 343. MARRIAGE & FA?, -
my 305 (1972).
85. Id. at 143; see Constantine & Constantine, The Group Marriage, in THE NUCLEAR
FAMILY IN CRISIS: THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 204 (1972).
86. N. STiNNE & C. BIRDSONG, THE FAMmY AND ALTERNATIVE L1usT'YLEs 147-49
(1978). The authors note that "[tihe majority of the men and women in group marriage indi-
cate that they particularly enjoy sexual variety in the secure context of their group. They feel
that their living arrangement provides a depth of emotional commitment and involvement that
is not associated with most extramarital relationships." Id. at 147.
87. Mk at 149-61.
88. Id. at 101-36; see also Brudnell, Radical Community: Contemporary Communes and
Intentional Communities, in CONTEMPORARY FAMILIs AND ALTERNATIVES LIFESTYLES:
HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH AND THEORY 235 (1983); Kanter, Communes, 4 PSYCHOLOGY To-
DAY 53 (1970).
89. N. STINNETr & C. BIRDSONG, supra note 86, at 110, note that among commune mer-
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ous communes had differing structures and rules (if any),91 as well as varying
degrees of success,92 they all shared a common goal: to create a family system
based on sharing rather than exclusivity93 and organized around elected rather
than biological family ties.94
Of course, none of these family structures is, in itself, new.9" Nor, in fact,
are politically or socially idealized schemes for alternative families.96 How-
ever, the energy provided by the social changes discussed above created a new
self-consciousness about these experiments. Widespread discussion of a grow-
ing dissatisfaction with "the family" and an attendant variety of proposed and
bers "[t]he desire to belong to a larger family group has been expressed over and over. This
generally is a reaction against the extremely individualistic, fragmentary type of family life that
many people experience today." Kanter, supra note 88, at 53-57, observes that communes were
formed in order to seek "family warmth and intimacy" and "to become extended families."
90. "For some communes becoming a family means collective childrearing, shared respon-
sibility for raising children." Kanter, supra note 88, at 54.
91. N. STINNETr & C. BIRDSONG, supra note 86, at 104-08.
92. Id. at 131.
93. Id. at 109-10.
94. Id. at 135.
95. For example, communal arrangements have been attempted throughout history with
various levels of success. One of the most successful long-standing contemporary example of
communes is the Israeli kibbutz, which functions as a self-contained communal unit: individu-
als do form dyadic relationships, but all work, meals, childrearing, and recreation occur on a
communal level. Moreover, marriage itself has no effect on either the standing or the responsi-
bilities of kibbutz members. Spouses retain their own names, and children are raised in a com-
munal children's house. Spiro, Is the Family Universal? The Israeli Case, in THE NUCLEAR
FAMILY IN CRISIS 81 (M. Gordon ed. 1972). Group marriages have also been thought to exist
sporadically throughout history and across cultures. N. STINNETT & C. BIRDSONO, supra note
86, at 140; see also F. ELLIOT, supra note 8, at 196. Cohabitation does not seem to have been
attempted as a conscious alternative to marriage as frequently as communal families or group
marriage. However, such influential thinkers as Bertrand Russell and Margaret Mead have
formulated it as a desirable precursor to marriage in the form of a "trial marriage." B. Rus-
SELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS (1957); Mead, Marriage in Two Steps, 127 REDBOOK 48
(1966). Cohabitation, some believe, strengthens the institution of marriage by allowing partners
to live together and thereby to learn more about each other and about the dynamics of living as
a couple. This conflation of cohabitation and marriage as a way to shore up the latter institu-
tion has also been written into law. The category of common-law marriage legally codifies
cohabitation. For discussion of similarities and differences between cohabitation and common-
law marriage, see generally Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage and the Possibility
of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829 (1987). Generally, common-law marriage differs
from cohabitation in that it confers all rights, privileges, and obligations accorded in law to
married spouses upon individuals so bonded. Thus it is legally indistinguishable from marriage,
except that cohabitation initiates it, rather than civil license.
96. Proposals for alternative communities date back to Plato's Republic in which Socrates
outlines a complex aristocratic society. See PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 575-844 (E.
Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1971). Thomas More designed a similar model in 1566. See T.
MORE, UTOPIA (R. Robinson tr. 1970). Periodically, individuals have made more concrete
attempts to implement utopian communities. One of the most well-known and successful was
the Oneida Colony, founded in New York State in 1844 and lasting until around 1880. Among
its many innovations in family structure, the colony included the concept of universal marriage,
in which all members participated. This marriage was entirely separated from institutional
support of childbirth and childrearing. Kephart, Experimental Family Organization: An His-
torico-Cultural Report on the Oneida Community, 25 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY LIVING 261-71
(1963).
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attempted alternatives have reached beyond individual proposals or isolated
alternative communities, and no longer operate by assuming majority accept-
ance of the traditional nuclear family.
Feminist and other criticisms of the nuclear family paradigm interacted
with changes in public opinion and public behavior to engender a final critique
of Parsons' functionalist model: it does not reflect reality. More and more
people are living in families that do not conform to the "traditional" model.9
In addition, the contemporary proliferation of "alternative" families has ex-
posed analysts not only to the changes occurring in primarily middle-class
America but also to the variety of family structures across class and culture
within the United States.
This growing awareness prompted anthropologists and other scholars to
turn their attention to the family units of subcultures within the United States
and their development. The most thoroughly examined family relations were
those in working class and underclass black communities. 98 Researchers re-
ported that, within these communities, bonded heterosexual couples raising
their own children were the exception rather than the norm. They attributed
this finding in part to the common absence of adult men in family structures.
Unlike the practice in white communities, in which single mothers bore almost
all of the responsibility for raising their children, in these black communities, a
larger "kinship" group shared childrearing responsibilities." Some, although
not enough, research explores differing family relationships among Chi-
cano, 1' Asian American,"0 and other ethnic cultures, as well as among differ-
ent social classes"02 and sexual orientations.1
0 3
Though some of this work is still in its infancy, the great diversity of
critiques of the nuclear family, combined with changing social reality, and a
simultaneous political movement encouraging women to challenge the
97. For example, according to the 1990 census, only 26% of the nation's households con-
sist of two parents of the opposite sex living together with children. Only One U.S Family in
Four is "TraditionaL" supra note 78, at A19, col. 1.
98. Researchers had made such observations before, but generally with an eye toward con-
demnation of the "disorganized" black family. See, e.g., D. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965); G. MYRDAL, AN AMRIcAN DILEMMA: THE NE-
GRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 930-35 (1945).
99. An example of this type of ethnography is C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR
SURVIVAL IN A BLACK CoMMuNrrY (1975), which examines the exchange systems linking kin
and non-kin in impoverished urban black families, with an eye toward examining the ways in
which women, men, and children collectively adapt to poverty.
100. See Montiel, The Social Science Myth of the Mexican American Family, 3 EL G rrO:
J. CONTEMP. MEX. Am. THOUGHT 56-63 (1970); see also lMirand6, Chicano Families, in MAR-
RIAGE AND FAmY, supra note 76, at 56-61.
101. See Sue & Kitano, Asian American Stereotypes, 29 J. Soc. IssuEs 83-98 (1973).
102. For a discussion of reliance upon extended kinship networks for the purpose of child-
care among working-class families, see Rubin, Worlds of Fain, in MARRIAGE AND FAmuLY,
supra note 76, at 39.
103. See P. BLumSEwn & P. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5 (a comparative study of the impact
of money, work, and sex on the lives of lesbian and gay couples, as well as married and unmar-
ried heterosexual couples).
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gendered roles within the family resulted in new ways of talking about fami-
lies, and led to criticism of Parsons' theories. Thus we start now from a point
in which this still-influential theory of family has been shown to lack a norma-
tive base, and to fail to reflect social reality.
C. Toward a Recognition of Pluralistic Family Definitions
The accumulating changes in the perceptions and realities of "the family"
have initiated a rethinking of previously hegemonic family structures. This
movement to reconceptualize family (or the threat of it) has engendered many
seemingly contradictory definitions of the contemporary family. Indeed, the
interaction among these formulations exemplifies the interrelated values wo-
ven into them. While it may seem that the AHEA definition'0 4 more accu-
rately reflects modem notions of family than does the Pro-Family Coalition
definition,105 neither can be solely incorporated into law if the real goal is to
include as many potential family forms (and therefore as many potential fam-
ily definitions) as possible. Any system which is truly representative of the
present realities of "family" in contemporary cultures in the United States
must be based on a heterodoxy of opinion as to what constitutes the family.
Certainly, many families might find the AHEA definition too burdensome in
its requirements of intimacy and sharing among all members at all times, or
too rigid in excluding other more tenuous family ties. Other families might
likewise reject the Pro-Family Coalition's definition because of its narrow fo-
cus on biology and orthodox marriage. A further limitation arises from the
assumption, shared by both the AHEA and Pro-Family Coalition definitions,
that every family relationship entails a similar amount of connection, interde-
pendence, and commitment. However, many families comprise a variety of
different family ties which presume different layers of interrelation: various
levels of parenting responsibility, emotional commitment, resource sharing,
and so on.
10 6
What is needed is a more pluralistic understanding - a theory of self-
defining families. Individuals comprise a family because they believe them-
selves to be in a family; because they speak of their relationships in the lan-
guage of "family." Rather than imposing a rubric of the standard nuclear
family (now exposed, more often than not, as a fiction) from the outside, we
must listen to the messages emanating from inside the family. Previously un-
acknowledged family forms - such as unmarried partners, step-families, les-
bian and gay families, communal households, group parents, extended
families, and foster families - achieve new validity due to the commitment
104. Supra text accompanying note 9.
105. Supra text accompanying note 7.
106. Generally, within the law, family is an exclusive relationship - either you are or you
aren't. Part of this Note's agenda is to question this assumption and to leave room for a multi-
plicity of family relations which entail various levels of commitment and obligations without
excluding others.
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they exhibit: a commitment that extends not simply to the other individuals in
the relationship but to the maintenance of the family itself.
This discovery goes beyond theory. Researchers have gathered evidence
of self-defined families which demonstrates that even in the absence of tradi-
tional family connections, individuals feel themselves to be in family relation-
ships. These researchers have found strong familial bonds between step-
parents and step-children, °7 children and non-biological parental figures (in-
cluding lesbian or gay co-parents),108 unmarried partners, 9 lesbian and gay
couples, 110 and members of group and/or communal households, 21 among
others. As Sandra Rovira, a lesbian co-parent, describes her relationship with
her late lover's children: "We were a family like any other family, and we
deserved to be treated like one."
112
While this theory of a self-selected or self-defining family is somewhat
comprehensive when applied to adult relationships, its complexity increases
when it deals with the relationships between dependent children and their par-
ents. Children, especially when young, have a limited ability to choose their
families and have special needs within the family. They require emotional,
material, and physical support; they also benefit greatly from having strong
and loving relationships with adults who serve as parents, a relatively stable
home environment (both emotionally and geographically), ethical and spiri-
tual guidance, and positive adult role models.
1 1 3
Because of these requirements, the role of parent has always been com-
plex. With the increased number of divorced, step-, and non-biological par-
ents raising children, the division of rights and obligations to children has
grown even more complicated. Whereas it was once presumed that the major-
ity of children would be conceived by, born to, and raised into adulthood by
107. Bernstein, Unravelling the Tangles" Children's Understanding of Stepfamily Kinship,
in W. BEER, supra note 74, at 83-111; see also C Ascher's narrative, Stepmother, in WOM ,EN
AND STEPFAmmS: VOICES OF ANGER AND LOVE 44 (1989).
108. See Brief for Amici Curiae of Eleven Concerned Academics, Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 155 A.D.2d 11, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. C. 1990) (No. 3042E), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572
N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
109. See Macklin, Nonmarital Heterosexual Cohabitation, in FAMILIES IN TRANSITION
supra note 20, at 214 (noting that commitment between members of cohabiting couples varies
widely but that at least some of these couples live together in "a long term committed relation-
ship similar to marriage").
110. See B. BERZON, PERMANENT PARTNERS: BUILDING GAY AND LESBIAN RELA-
TIONSHIPS THAT LAST (1988); see also P. BLUMSTEIN & B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 502-
45; D. MCWHIRTER & A. MATTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP
(1984); THE BOSTON LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES COLLECTIVE, LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES: EX-
PLORATIONS AND CHALLENGES 5-6 (1987); Suit Over Death Benefits Ask, What is a Family?,
supra note 1, at B7, col. 3.
111. See N. STnNXr & C. BIRDSONG, supra note 86, at 107 (quoting a rural commune
member who describes his "family" as including 16 people - five couples and their six biologi-
cal children).
112. Suit Over Death Benefits Asks What is a Family?, supra note 1, at B7, col. 3.
113. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNTrr, BEYOND THE BEST IN7ERE Ts
OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter BEYOND BEST INTERESTS].
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the same two parents, this is no longer always or even primarily the case. The
combination of high divorce rates, greater geographical mobility, the construc-
tion of-"alternative" families, and the growing fragility of urban community
infrastructures has led to an increased likelihood of a split between the person
conceiving and/or giving birth to the child and the person or persons raising
her.114 Now that the compound notion of "parent" is more likely to be appor-
tioned to any number of individuals, different parental roles are being distin-
guished. Thus, two options exist: either parenthood should be awarded to
certain individuals and withheld from others, or whoever wishes to be a parent
to a particular child should be allowed to be one.
The United States legal system is guided by the first principle. However,
as a society we have not yet decided which aspects of parenting are essential.
The law has encountered great difficulty determining which people qualify as
parents: those who share a direct biological connection with the child or those
who are willing to nurture and raise it. Greater complications arise in con-
flicts in which two or more individuals or sets of individuals who each fulfill
some, but not necessarily all, parental functions simultaneously vie for an ex-
clusive parental role.
Theory about the nuclear family is in flux. Recent scholarship challenges
the traditional understanding of the nuclear family and offers alternative vi-
sions of the essence of the family relationship and its significance. These new
and old definitions of family collide in the legal arena, to which the discussion
now turns.
II.
FAMILY DEFLNITIONS AND THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM
American constitutional law has increasingly come to view family auton-
omy as a fundamental right." 5 In its decisions on state regulation of the fam-
ily, the Supreme Court has repeatedly attempted to strike a balance between
permitting governmental intervention and recognizing the "right" of each
family to be free from external control. Such ambivalence surfaces in the
Court's 1943 reflection that its prior decisions had "respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter,"I 6 but that the family never-
theless was "not beyond regulation in the public interest."117 Commentators
114. Of course, adoption has always existed. However, rather than providing an ideologi-
cal alternative to biological parenthood, it functioned as a direct analogue. Biological parents of
adopted children traditionally give up all claims to those children. The adopted child takes her
new parents' family name and in some cases is not even told that she is not their biological
child.
115. While this area of constitutional law is understandably confusing and contradictory,
the cases and commentary discussed below suggest that the law is moving in this direction. See,
eg., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2943 (1990) ("the family has a privacy interest in
the upbringing and education of children and the intimacies of the marriage relationship which
is protected by the Constitution against undue state interference").
116. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
117. Id.
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have noted that the Court has over time shifted toward a recognition that a
state may not intervene in the family's private governance except in cases
where it has a heightened, even compelling interest' 1 8 Traditionally, courts
have found such a state interest in the protection of children 1 9 or the preven-
tion of inequality or abuse." ° Indeed, some courts have explicitly found a
"fundamental right of family integrity," and have suggested that the existence
of real physical or emotional harm should be required to justify state intrusion
into family life.' 2' For this reason, the family is often regarded in law as a
118. Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination ofParentalRights, 19 FAM. LQ. 245,
246 (1985) (citing language in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), which discusses
"the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of
their child" as evidence of the Supreme Court's recognition of the fundamental right of family
independence); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (overturning the Virginia
miscegenation statute and finding that "the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness ... [and] fundamental to
our very existence and survival"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that
"[the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment includes] the right of the individual... to
marry, establish a home and bring up children" without undue restriction).
119. For example, the state may require children of a certain age to attend school, see
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1924), but such interference must be balanced
with a parent's right to choose the kind of school her child will attend, even if the parent's
choice is a private parochial school rather than a secular public institution. Id. at 531, 534-35;
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("a State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, such as... the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children").
120. That is, the state may act to ensure that children are cared for by fit parents, to
prevent spousal or child abuse, and so forth. See, eg., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745-
46 (1982) (holding that a state may "permanently and irrevocably" sever parental rights to
child custody if it can demonstrate "permanent neglect" by clear and convincing evidence); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (1962) ("Endangering Welfare of Children") (stipulating
that "[a] parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 commits a
misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child's welfare by violating a duty of care, protec-
tion or support"); Comment, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center Way Domestic
Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY LJ. 855 (1985) (discussing criminal sanc-
tions for perpetrators of intra-family violence). In addition, in recognition of the potential for
abuse of power during the dissolution of relationships, the state may supervise divorce and
custody proceedings. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MIcH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 840 n.9 (1985).
However, the state does not act to prevent all forms of intra-family coercion. For example,
the exemption of forced sexual intercourse between spouses from the definition of rape in the
Model Penal Code (section 213.1 (1)) and the statutes of many states has been widely criticized.
See, eg., Bearrows, Transition: Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rap= A Statutory Propo-
sal, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 201; Hil% Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEWv ENG. L. REv.
31 (1980); Note, To Have and to Hold- The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986). For a discussion of legislators' opinions that
prohibiting marital rape would be an unjustified intrusion into the family, see Olsen, supra, at
841.
121. For example, the right to family autonomy has been deemed "essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and considered a "basic
civil right," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), which is "far more precious...
than [are] property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). Constitutional man-
dates to protect the self-determination of the family have been found in the ninth amendment,
see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), the due pro-
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private social force, the existence of which the law must respect and take into
account, rather than as an entity which is defined by the law itself.122
Although the state intrudes daily into family decision-making, such interven-
tions have increasingly come to be seen as necessary evils to be exercised as
unrestrictively as possible.123
However, in the process of recognizing the unique social significance of
"the family" as modem society constructs it, American law, like other disci-
plines, has enshrined the mythological nuclear family as its ideal model. The
law acknowledges as family heterosexually-married adult partners and their
biological or adopted children. In addition, it recognizes extended kin as de-
fined by the Pro-Family Coalition's formulation of "blood, marriage, or adop-
tion." Courts generally grant such kin a status secondary to that of nuclear
family members, 24 though occasionally persons with kinship ties outside of
the nuclear family may gain recognition of their ties similar to that afforded to
the bonds of the nuclear family. 25 Rarely included in the equation are un-
married heterosexual partners, lesbian and gay partners, multi-adult partner-
ships, non-sexual/non-romantic domestic partnerships, relationships between
parents and non-biological, non-adopted children," 6 friendship networks, and
so on.
The dominance of the nuclear family in law arises at least in part in its
cess clause, see Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974), and the equal protection clause, see Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. For discussion of
the constitutional limits which these Supreme Court decisions and others place on state actions
to regulate the family, see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-52 (1972). See also Davis v.
Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 261 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (noting that "the right to integrity of the family is
among the most fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment"), aff'd, 618 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1980); Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1977)
(reporting the court's belief that "it is... clear that there is a fundamental right emanating from
the Constitution, which protects the integrity of the family unit from unwarranted intrusion by
the state"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
122. See, eg., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845
(1977) ("liberty interest in family privacy has its source... not in state law, but in intrinsic
human rights") (footnote omitted).
123. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of this ideology in American law, see Olsen,
supra note 120, at 839-40.
124. This is particularly true in the context of inheritance and guardianship questions.
Commonly, such family members are considered untestamentary heirs or guardians only if no
nuclear family member can fill the position.
125. For example, courts and commentators have in recent years begun to recognize
grandparents' interest in having visitation with their natural grandchildren. See, e.g., Note, The
Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 118 (1986);
Note, Grandparents' Statutory Visitation Rights and the Rights of Adoptive Parents, 49 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 149 (1982); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding
that a grandmother residing with her two grandchildren should be considered a single family
for the purpose of zoning laws).
126. Recognition of parental caretakers who are not legal parents (that is biological or
adoptive parents or appointed guardians) has become more common in recent years, but is still
a problematic question. See infra notes 160-88 and accompanying text (examining new defini-
tions of adult-child relationships in the law).
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predication on the marital 2 7 relationship of the two heterosexual adult part-
ners. 2 ' Most jurisdictions limit marriage to partners in monogamous 29 het-
erosexual 3° relationships which are presumed to be romantic/sexual in
nature. 131 Since persons whose relationships are not included within this ru-
127. The term "marital" includes common-law marriage. Common-law marriage grants
marital privileges to unmarried cohabiting heterosexual partners, and as such could weigh
against the claim that unmarried relationships suffer from lack of legal recognition. However,
in a larger sense, common-law marriage can be seen as simply an alternative means of establish-
ing a marital relationship. It is open to exactly the same subset of potential adult relationships,
it provides the same benefits and requires the same obligations, and in almost all respects is
treated similarly to certified marriage. In that sense, it is quite distinct from the situation faced
by "unmarried" partners. See generally Kandoian, supra note 95.
128. The fact that children are presumed to arise naturally from such a union and are seen
to complete the family seems only to emphasize that the partnership itself, regardless of its
formality, initiates and circumscribes the family.
129. By monogamous I mean to indicate that marriage is intended to be exclusive, and no
person is permitted to have more than one'spouse. Most marriage statutes stipulate that per-
sons applying for marriage licenses may not be married to any other person. Indeed, intentional
marriage to more than one person is often considered criminal behavior. See, eg., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.1(1)-(2) (1962) ("A married person is guilty of bigamy, a misdemeanor, if
he contracts or purports to contract another marriage... [and] a person is guilty of polygamy,
a felony in the first degree, if he marries or cohabits with more than one spouse at a time in a
purported exercise of the right of plural marriage."). This may be true even if the prohibition
against multiple marriage interferes with religious tenets. See Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1887) (upholding an anti-bigamy statute against challenges by members of the Jesus
Christ Church of Latter Day Saints that polygamy was a required religious practice).
A requirement of monogamy in the sense of sexual exclusivity within marriage may be
enforced by the state. In states that retain fault-based divorce systems, adultery committed by
one partner is grounds for divorce by the other. See, eg., N.Y. DoM. RELATIONS LAW
§ 170(4) (McKinney 1991). Moreover, many states retain prohibitions against adultery in their
penal codes. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-81 (1990). Until quite recently such provisions
were almost never enforced, but in recent years several prosecutions for adultery have gained
national attention. For discussion of recent prosecution for adultery as a misdemeanor or fel-
ony offense in such states as New York, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and New Hampshire, see, e.g.,
Adultery Charge Filed, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 3, 1991, at 18; In Connecticut, Adultery Victims
Call the Cops, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 23, 1990, at 16C; Adultery. It s Not Just a Sin. It's a
Crime, The Washington Times, June 29, 1990, at El.
130. At present, no state recognizes legal marriage between partners of the same gender.
In the early 1970s, several suits alleging that opposite-gender-specific marriage statutes violated
constitutional protections were soundly defeated. See, eg., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1973). For further discussion of these and other cases, see also Friedman, The Necessity
for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions
of Family, 3 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 135, 137-44 (1987-88). The issue has gained wide pub-
licity recently in connection with a new legal challenge in the District of Columbia. See Gay
Couple Fghts for Spousal Rights, The Boston Globe, Mar. 4, 1991, at 38. Despite the non-legal
status of marriages between same sex couples, many religious groups perform such ceremonies,
and they have become increasingly popular in the lesbian and gay community. See B. BUTLER,
CEREMONIES OF THE HEART: CELEBRATING LESBIAN UNIONS (1990); Pettit, Lesbian Mar-
riages' Tying the Knot (Noose?): Sarah Pettit on the Current Phenomenon, OuTwEEK: NEW
YoRK's LESBIAN AND GAY NEWS MAGAZINE, Sept. 18, 1989, at 38-40.
131. In fact, marriage may be legally required to be romantic and/or sexual in nature if it
serves the function of ensuring one party's immigration. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L
No. 101-649, § 602(g), 104 Stat. 4978, 5079 (marriage fraud as a ground for deportation). An-
ecdotal evidence indicates that since the passage of this act, the Immigration and Naturalization
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bric may not marry, by extension under traditional legal theory they also may
not form families.
This lack of legal recognition of non-nuclear or kin-based family bonds
creates legal disabilities for members of such families. The family's status as
an important social institution is recognized through special consideration in
such areas of law as the tax code,132 social benefits policies,13 3 intestate succes-
sion statutes and spousal right of election, 13 4 proxy decisionmaling, 135 zoning
regulations,1 3 6 state subpoena power,1 37 child-visitation and child-custody
agreements a1 3  and support obligations,13 9 among others. 14° Thus, families
Service has begun to examine closely the day-to-day family experiences of foreign nationals who
marry American citizens, in order to assure that the relationship between the spouses is suffi-
ciently intimate. See, e.g., Farrell, For Immigrants Trying to Obtain the Coveted Green Card,
Marriage May be a Treacherous Strategy, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, Feb. 25, 1991, at 93-95.
132. Married partners have the option of filing joint income taxes and may thus pay less
than the sum of each partner's tax were they to file separately. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp.
1991) (tax tables); 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1988) (authorizing joint returns by married couples). In
addition, when spouses inherit from one another's estate, they are exempt from paying taxes on
their inheritance; no such exemption exists for unmarried partners. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056
(1988).
133. For example, a surviving spouse may be entitled to social security benefits on behalf
of her deceased partner, but no such benefits may be collected for an unmarried partner. On the
other hand, some benefits may cease upon remarriage, thus privileging cohabiting partners over
married ones in this situation. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(c) (1988).
134. Intestate succession statutes generally grant the bulk of an estate to the surviving
legal spouse. See E. SCALES & E. KALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 44-45 (2d ed. 1973). In addition, many states have provisions permit-
ting the exercise of common-law right of election for spouses, so that legal spouses may not be
completely disinherited from their partner's estate, regardless of the decedent's wishes. Id. at
74-77. Legally unrecognized partners, conversely, are not entitled to any portion of their
spouse's estate except what is specifically granted to them by valid testament.
135. In the case of temporarily or permanently incapacitated adults, the state usually turns
to the "immediate family" to make necessary medical decisions, and to act as guardian, should
one be needed. Note, supra note 8, at 1031-34. One poignant example of the injustice that may
ensue from such presumptions is detailed in K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T
SHARON KowALSKI COME HOME? (1988) (describing Karen Thompson's attempts to gain
guardianship of her lover, who was seriously injured in an automobile accident). Karen
Thompson was recently granted guardianship of Sharon Kowalski by a Minnesota appellate
court. In re Kowalski, No. C2-91-1047 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1991) (1991 Minn. App.
LEXIS 1196).
136. For example, single-family dwelling restrictions in many zoning regulations are pre-
sumed to include only traditionally defined families. But see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which included a definition of
family that prevented a grandmother from living with her two grandchildren in a single-family
dwelling).
137. At common law, spouses were exempted from giving forced testimony against one
another, and either spouse could claim the privilege. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77
(1958). At present, most states recognize spousal immunity, but the Supreme Court has
adopted the position that only the testifying spouse may exercise the privilege. Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). No such privilege is recognized between unmarried
partners.
138. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing absolute preference given
to legal (generally biological or adoptive) parents).
139. Parents are legally required to support their children financially, and spouses owe a
duty of support to one another. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital
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whose ties to one another are legally unrecognized often lack the protections
granted to legally-recognized families in these areas.
However, family ties which are not codified by law do not always go un-
recognized. In some cases, courts have found family ties to exist between indi-
viduals whose relationships were not normally included within the law. In
such cases, the non-legal relationship in question has generally been found to
be analogous to a legally recognized family form, and the parties are therefore
considered to have similar privileges and obligations as their more traditional
counterparts. The following discussion addresses two areas in which these
legal developments have occurred: legal recognition of non-traditional forms
of partnership and acknowledgement of parental bonds outside of biological or
legal parental relationships.
A. Expansion of the Legal Recognition of Partnership
One of the first successful challenges to the primacy of married relation-
ships involved actor Lee Marvin and Michelle Triola Marvin. The two lived
together without marrying for six years before dissolving their relationship. In
a suit which drew extensive media coverage in 1976, Ms. Marvin claimed that
the two had entered into an oral joint property agreement at the commence-
ment of their relationship, which Mr. Marvin refused to honor at their
breakup. 4 ' The trial court in that case dismissed the action for failure to state
a claim, but in a precedent-setting opinion one year later, the California
Supreme Court overruled the trial court. It noted that Ms. Marvin had "the
same rights to enforce contracts and to assert her equitable interest in property
acquired through her effort as [did] any other unmarried person."142 Previ-
ously, such arrangements were held to be meretricious 4 3 and thus unenforce-
able in law, since public policy bars the enforcement of illegal contracts. The
California Court noted that "the mores of society [had] indeed changed...
radically in regard to cohabitation,"' 44 and concluded that to view property or
support agreements between members of unmarried couples as akin to prosti-
tution would "do violence to an accepted and wholly different practice."'
45
The California Supreme Court thus radically altered the legal status of
cohabitating couples in its jurisdiction, and ruled that Ms. Marvin's rights
were essentially equal to those to which she would have been entitled had she
Barrier is in a Child's Best Interest, 3 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 96, 123-24 (1987-88). Such
legal family obligations often do not extend to ordinarily unrecognized partners or co-parents.
140. For a more detailed description of the potential disabilities that unrecognized families
may face in law, see Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the LegalDefinition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1640, 1642-43 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Family Resemblance].
141. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
142. Id. at 684 n.24, 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
143. That is, based on an exchange of sexual services for money.
144. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
145. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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and Mr. Marvin been married. 146
In a more recent case, the New York Court of Appeals extended its rec-
ognition of families to lesbian and gay partners with regard to tenancy succes-
sion in the landmark case, Braschi v. Stahl Associates47 The appellant in the
case, Miguel Braschi, resided with his partner Leslie Blanchard in a rent-con-
trolled apartment for a number of years. Blanchard was the tenant of record,
and upon his death Braschi was served with papers asking him to vacate the
premises. However, New York rent-control regulations provide that upon the
death of a tenant, a landlord is not permitted to dispossess "either the surviv-
ing spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased ten-
ant's family who has been living with the tenant.""14 Braschi argued that as a
member of a family with Blanchard, he was entitled to remain. The court
agreed, holding that the term family should not be rigidly restricted to those
people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining a marriage certifi-
cate or adoption order.149 The court found that the New York legislature
intended the term family "to extend protection to those who reside in house-
holds having all of the normal familial characteristics." 150 In an inexhaustive
list of those characteristics, the court included the exclusivity and longevity of
the relationship, the manner and conduct of the parties' everyday lives, and
their reliance upon one another for daily family services."' 1 The court con-
cluded that Braschi and his deceased partner's relationship amply met these
criteria, and awarded him tenancy.
15 2
Statutory innovations have also attempted to recognize currently non-
legal partnerships. One of the most publicized is the recently-passed San
Francisco Domestic Partnership Act.1 3 The Act provides a registry for do-
mestic partners who live or work in the city. To qualify, a partnership must
consist of two adults who are neither married nor living in a partnership ar-
rangement with anyone else.' 54  Domestic partnership is not the legal
equivalent of marriage, since it confers no automatic recognition of partner-
ship outside of the city; nevertheless, the act of registering as domestic part-
ners might confer a legal obligation of support, as well as other rights and
duties accorded wedded spouses.
15 5
146. Note, however, that the amount Ms. Marvin was awarded was eventually overturned;
in the end, she received nothing. 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (App. 1981);
Michelle Marvin Loses Bid to Regain $104,000 Award, N.Y. Times, Oct 9, 1981, at A14, col. 4.
147. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
148. NEw YORK CITY RENT AND EVICTION REGULATIONS 9 NYCRR § 2204.6(d) (for-
merly NEW YORK CITY RENT AND EvIcToN REGULATIONS § 56 (d)).
149. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 207, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
150. Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
151. Id. at 212-13, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
152. New York has extended this reasoning to include tenancy of rent-stabilized apart-
ments as well. See Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgens, 164 A.D.2d 283, 562 N.Y.S.2d 962
(Sup. Ct. 1990).
153. SAN FRANCISCO, CA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 4001-4010 (1991).
154. Id. § 4002.
155. See id. § 4002(d).
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Thus, though none has gained widespread acceptance, a number of legal
innovations have begun to alter definitions of partnership to reflect pluralistic
notions of the family. However, these reforms remain problematic. Rather
than providing a real challenge to the primacy of the nuclear family, these
changes simply extend its reaches. None of the new forms of partnership dis-
cussed above includes partnerships among more than two adults, and none
permits family relationships to be formed between partners who are not ro-
mantically or sexually linked. Moreover, cases such as Marvin do not chal-
lenge the civil function of the institution of marriage; rather, they simply add
its legal protections to another subset of relationships. These limited develop-
ments have had a positive effect in the law, yet only Braschi, with its recogni-
tion of legal protection for single-sex relationships, involves a significant
reevaluation within the law of what it means to be a family. To date, the
reasoning in that case is accepted only in one jurisdiction and only in certain
narrow circumstances. 15 6 Thus the question of how we might alter the legal
definition of partnership to include a pluralistic concept remains open.
Legal scholars have proposed numerous solutions for closing the gaps left
in current family definitions. In dealing with partnership relations, some have
argued that marriage laws must be extended to lesbian and gay couples, 57
while others have lobbied for widespread domestic partnership legislation.15 8
Still others propose wholly new definitions of family which use functional tests
to determine each individual's most "significant relationships," be they based
on ties of blood, partnership, or friendship.'59
B. Expansion of Parenting Relationships in the Law
The non-nuclear family relationships to which courts have been perhaps
most willing to grant legal acknowledgement involve children's relationships
to their non-biological, non-adoptive caregivers. Traditionally, adult partners
were presumed both to conceive children and to raise them within the confines
of the nuclear family. Adopted children took the same place in the family as
biological children. Upon adoption, all ties with their own biological parents
were severed, and they became enmeshed solely within their new house-
156. For example, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the logic of Braschi in Alison D.
v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991) (woman who had live.
in relationship with child's mother was not a parent within meaning of statute allowing "either
parent" to apply for a writ of habeas corpus to determine the issue of visitation rights, following
the termination of the parties' relationship).
157. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 120.
158. See, e.g., Ettedbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUr/LooK, Fall
1989, at 17.
159. See Note, supra note 8, at 1074 (arguing that medical proxy courts should no longer
look automatically to the nearest blood relative of the patient in question, but should turn
instead to her "primary significant relationship... whether that be the patient's spouse, spousal
equivalent in the case of unmarried adults, a close friend, or a relative"). This formulation
includes partnership relationships rather than spousal ones.
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holds."W With the rise of more flexible family and caregiving arrangements,
however, a distinction has increasingly arisen between the work of conceiving
and bearing a child and the work of nurturing one, since these tasks are often
split among several persons. In order to make a determination among all of
these parental figures, should such a need arise, society and courts must deter-
mine the essence of parenthood.
In cases of dispute among claimants of parental rights, courts have long
used the "best interests of the child" standard to determine who should have
parental rights, but exactly what this examination entails is unclear at best. 6
Historically, the law viewed children as property of their biological parents
and awarded custody based on this "right." '62 Thus even as the reasoning for
awarding child custody has shifted from a focus on the parent's rights to those
of the child, many jurisdictions presume that biological parents have a natural
right to nurture and raise their children,' 63 a right that can only be infringed
upon a showing that a parent is unfit or has abandoned her child. ' , Still
other jurisdictions employ presumptions of varying weight in favor of biologi-
cal parents, 6 ' but allow non-biological parents an opportunity to rebut these
presumptions and petition for custodial rights. 66
Partly in reaction to this deference to biological parenting, Joseph Gold-
160. In fact, until relatively recently, most states required the sealing of adoption records
even from the participants, in order to facilitate the fiction that the child had no other "famil-
ial" ties. See Section of Family Law Adoption Comm., DraftABA Model State Adoption Act, 19
FAM. L.Q. 103, 126-27 (1985) (section 28) (providing for secret records which may be opened
only upon a showing of "good cause").
161. In some jurisdictions, factors to be taken into account in determining a child's best
interest are stipulated by statute. Yet the differences among such statutory guidelines is glaring.
Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1988) with UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 402 (1970).
162. Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 672, 674-75 (1942); see also
Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody is Constitutionally Pro-
tected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705, 706-07 & n.6 (1986) [hereinafter Biological Parents].
163. In addition, many courts of the 1970s and 1980s imposed an additional presumption
in favor of a young child's mother as her preferred custodial parent. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 515-16 (1984) (noting
the criticism of such a presumption because of its seeming reliance on outdated stereotypes
regarding women's inherent superiority in parenting, yet reporting that some theorists still ar-
gue in favor of such a formulation). More recently, commentators have urged courts to discard
this standard, and instead to focus their custodial presumptions on the child's primary caretaker
regardless of gender. Id. at 527-30. Other courts encourage joint custody between a child's
parents even after the termination of their relationship; see, eg., M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD,
THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY (1978). Custody issues are tre-
mendously complex; courts often have to make a number of sensitive factual determinations in
order to decide what configuration of custody will serve the best interests of the child, even if
presumptions are employed.
164. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed this standard in Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230
Kan. 146, 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982). See S. KATZ, WHEN PAR-
ENTS FAIL 4 (1971); see also Biological Parents, supra note 162, at 708-10.
165. For a more thorough examination of degrees of parental presumptions, see Biological
Parents, supra note 162, at 711-21.
166. Presently, 29 states use some form of presumption in favor of biological parents. Id.
at 711 n.22.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1058 [Vol. XVIII:1027
DEFINING THE FAMILY
stein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit published in 1973 the influential interdis-
ciplinary study Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.16 This work argued
that if courts were truly concerned with making child welfare paramount in
custody decisions, they would consider children's need for permanency and
consistency in their interactions with parental figures. Thus, they proposed,
the state should not interfere with the relationship between a "Wanted
child"' 68 and her "psychological parent," who "through interaction, compan-
ionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological [and] physi-
cal needs,"' 69 unless it becomes absolutely necessary.
Varying formulae in a number of cases have applied this conception of
psychological parenting,17 0 and at least one state statute has incorporated its
essence.' 71 Moreover, some commentators have argued that such a standard
is constitutionally mandated so that any preference shown for biological par-
ents is unconstitutional. 72
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly reached the question of
whether biology is determinative of family relations, it has implied that par-
ent-child relationships may transcend biological closeness in its recognition
that, while the "usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relation-
ships,"'17 such "biological relationships are not exclusive determination of the
existence of a family."174 Thus, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court
concluded that a zoning ordinance prohibiting a grandmother from living with
her grandchildren violated the due process clause, since "[o]urs is by no means
a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear
family.' 1 75 In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form, the Court addressed foster parents' claim that they had a liberty interest
167. BEYOND BEsr INTERESTS, supra note 113.
168. That is, "one who received affection and nourishment on a continuing basis from at
least one adult and who feels that he or she is and continues to be valued by those who take care
of her." Id. at 98.
169. Id.
170. See, eg., Zack v. Fiebert, 235 NJ. Super. 424, 563 A.2d 58 (App. Div. 1989) (apply-
ing "best interest" standard in custody challenge by third party, where such person can show
that she stands in the place of a parent); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978) (holding
that a stepfather standing in loco parentis to his stepson could be considered a parent for pur-
poses of visitation rights).
171. Oregon allows anyone who has "established emotional ties creating a child-parent
relationship with a child" to petition for custody. OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119(l) (1991). The
child-parent relationship is defined as one in which "a person having physical custody of a child
or residing in the same household as the child supplied... food, clothing, shelter and incidental
necessaries and provided the child with necessary care, education and discipline, and which
relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and
mutuality, that fulfilled the child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physi-
cal needs." Id. § 109.119(4). Note that the last phrase of the statute reflects the text from
BEYoND BESr INTERSTs, as quoted supra text accompanying note 169.
172. Biological Parents, supra note 162, at 736-45.
173. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 421 U.S. 816, 843 (1977).
174. Id. (footnote omitted).
175. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
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in the survival of the family formed by themselves and their foster children. 176
While it decided the case on narrower grounds - namely that the foster par-
ents' challenge to preremoval procedures failed - the Court recognized that
"a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child
in his or her care may exist even in the absence of a blood relationship."
' 177
Likewise, in the earlier case of Prince v. Massachusetts, Sarah Prince, when
convicted of violating child labor prohibitions, claimed a liberty interest in the
parental right "to bring up the child in the way he should go,"""8 although she
was not Betty Simmons' mother, but her aunt. 9 The Court, in reaching its
decision, analyzed the case in the context of the parent-child relationship with
no reference to the fact that the actual relationship was not within the tradi-
tional nuclear framework.
Thus the array of factors which a court can or must consider in deciding
custody suits varies widely. Though an examination of psychological parent-
ing rather than an absolute preference for biological parenting may open up
options for the legal recognition of non-nuclear family members,1 80 sole legal
reliance on psychological parenting may also exclude some individuals whose
connection to the child is primary, such as biological parents who, because of
external circumstances, have not been afforded an opportunity to develop
emotional bonds with the child."'1 As a result, none of these standards may
sufficiently recognize contemporary pluralistic notions of parenthood. This
fact might partially explain the wide range of almost directly contradictory
alternatives adopted by different jurisdictions.
In her article exploring the legal options available to lesbian co-mothers,
Nancy Polikoff notes that a number of existing legal theories could be ex-
panded in order to recognize parental rights of such non-biological and non-
adoptive caregivers. Specifically, she argues that the recently-developed doc-
trine of equitable parenthood could be extended to such coparents,18 2 and the-
176. Smith, 431 U.S. at 839.
177. Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
178. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944). Prince was a Jehovah's Witness,
and the child under her care (also a Jehovah's Witness) had been selling copies of "Watch
Tower" and "Consolation," two Jehovah's Witnesses publications.
179. Id. at 162.
180. As the title of Nancy Polikoff's invaluable examination of rights of lesbian coparents
suggests: This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 461 (1990).
181. See, e-g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (permitting stepfather to adopt a
child over the objection of an unwed father who had failed to participate in his child's upbring-
ing); Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding Georgia statute requiring only the
mother's consent to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock, but granting veto power to an
unwed father who has acted in such a way as to recognize his child); see also Lassiter v. Dept. of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding that there exists no constitutional right to counsel in
a parental status termination proceeding).
182. Equitable parenthood, as outlined by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Atkinson v.
Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987), holds that a married man who had
raised his wife's son for four years without knowledge that he was not the biological father of
the child could not be denied custody or visitation of the child on the grounds of his demon-
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ories of equitable estoppel and in loco parentis should include the assertion of
parental rights by non-legal parents.1"3
The boundaries of parenthood may extend even further, however, accord-
ing to legal scholar Katharine Bartlett. In her germinal article, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status, Bartlett argues that parenthood need not
be limited to a maximum of one legal parent of each gender." She notes that
under our current system, one parent's legal ties to a child must often be ter-
minated before another parent may be recognized, usually through the process
of adoption."8 5 For example, in order to secure parental rights for a married
stepparent, the biological parent of that gender must agree to relinquish her
parental rights; if only one legal parent exists, her legal spouse may adopt her
child without the termination of her parenthood. If the legal parent is not
married to her partner, however, the adoption option would not be avail-
able.' 86 Bartlett argues for "non-exclusive" parenthood, which would allow
the legal addition of as many parent-child relationships as are found to exist
and are consented to by existing legal parents. Her solution avoids the legal
fiction that the formation of such a relationship invalidates previous ones.'8 7
Further suggestions for loosening the legal definition of parenthood intro-
duce the idea of intermediary parenting status. Thus, for example, stepparents
who take on primary (or co-primary) parenting responsibilities would be
awarded the status of "custodial parents." 88 As such, they would have legal
status similar to that of other legal parents; however, the child's relationship
with her non-custodial biological parent would not have to be terminated as
adoption would require. Thus the non-custodial biological parent retains a
continuing parental relationship with the child, but does not have full legal
authority. This idea could be extended further to form the beginning of a
system which recognized several parenting levels.
Each of these proposals attempts in some way to subvert traditional no-
tions of legal primacy for nuclear families. Most of these suggestions are of-
fered for the purpose of solving identified problems within the current legal
system; as such, they attempt to include nontraditional family notions without
altering the entire field to conform to a notion of family plurality. Neverthe-
strated nonpaternity. Since this case involves a marital heterosexual relationship, courts might
be unwilling to extend its reasoning to other forms of families; yet, following the Michigan
court's logic, other non-legal parents could be found to possess equitable parenthood. See Poli-
koff, supra note 180, at 483-86.
183. See Polikoff, supra note 180, at 492-500, 502-08.
184. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alterna-
tives When the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879 (1984).
185. Id. at 883-86.
186. Legal scholars have criticized this rule as well. See Patt, Second Parent Adoption:
When Crossing the Marital Barrier Is in the Child's Best Interests, 3 BERxELEY WomEN's LJ.
96 (1987-88) (arguing for adoption by unmarried partners who function as co-parents, without
termination of existing parental rights).
187. Bartlett, supra note 184, at 961-63.
188. Comment, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent Adoption, 12 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 604 (1979).
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less, taken as a whole, these proposals provide a backdrop for a radical analy-
sis of potential reconfigurations of legal definitions of family.
III.
POTENTIAL REFORMULATION OF THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF
THE FAMILY
If it were possible for the foundation of family law to reflect the existing
pluralities of family types, how would that law look? That is, if "the family"
were reconceived as a locus of endlessly possible permutations rather than as a
single prototype with only a limited potential for expansion by analogy, how
might a legal system which assumed multiplicity and self-determination of
family forms evaluate the existence of family ties?
In Part I, I discussed how the emerging social reality of multitudinous
family forms has combined with a normative critique to undermine the contin-
uing vitality of the Parsonian model of the nuclear family. However, as out-
lined in Part II, "alternative" families, despite these developments, continue to
face difficulties in their dealings with the current legal system in the United
States, which retains the nuclear family as its mold. Even progressive develop-
ments in the courts and among commentators fail to call into question the
basis of existing rules and limit their attempts to alter the legal definition of
family to extending existing rules to alternative families or exempting them
from the rules' coverage. In many ways, the nature of legal reasoning itself
encourages this process of comparison and identification; new, unfamiliar
models must be measured and classified against the old so that the existing
system of laws can absorb and apply them. However, a protocol requiring the
assimilation of evolving family forms into already existing models is often too
limiting, and does not permit questioning of the basic assumptions built into
those prior systems or of the law itself. Through cases such as Braschi and
Marvin, the courts have challenged the definitions of family; however, they
have not questioned the state-generated mechanism that applies these defini-
tions. Ultimately, the current system, which flattens diversity through the
process of assimilation, should be replaced by a new system that will incorpo-
rate and respect a multiplicity of family forms and the process of family self-
definition.
Therefore, what the law would ideally reflect is not any one codified defi-
nition - whether specifically described, open-ended, or in between - but the
beliefs and choices of family members themselves. In order to achieve this
goal, the fairest legal mechanism is one that relies on a definition of family
which emanates from within the relationship itself rather than one that in-
scribes a particular definition in the law."89
189. Clearly the state would not be obligated to respect choices it finds to be coercive in
any circumstance. For instance, the state could prohibit romantic/sexual involvement between
an adult and a child who was not mature enough to choose for herself whether to enter such a
partnership, regardless of how the state deals with family definitions in law.
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In order to most honestly evaluate the virtues and drawbacks of the cur-
rent mechanism of family definition, we must explore the many viable alterna-
tives to that scheme and extend them to their limits. This exploration must
make certain assumptions about contemporary society that do not, and possi-
bly could not, exist in the real world. For example, it would require an ability
to replace the existing legal order with any new system we choose. Moreover,
it takes for granted that the social inequities existing now would not be exag-
gerated by such a change in process of family definition in law.19 ° These as-
sumptions are necessary because observing these systems in a comparative
social vacuum provides a way in which to judge the inherent efficacy of each
mechanism to redress the hierarchies of family structures. It is likely that a
change in family policy would fail to radically alter the social power imbal-
ances already extant, and possibly could not avoid reproducing preexisting
inequities. Since these social inequities add to the difficulties experienced by
legally unrecognized families, they cannot truly be separated from the purely
theoretical aspects of this project. Yet in order to begin, this issue must be set
aside, at least temporarily. Given these caveats, this project's primary goal is
to open up a wider field of discourse about the possibilities for the family.
The section which follows initiates discussion on a variety of systems for
legal definitions of families, 9 1 untangling the ramifications of each system for
190. I recognize that this project has unrealistically utopian aspects. However, in order to
envision potential social goals, we must first focus almost entirely on the special problems of the
family, without becoming enmeshed in other social issues. This is not to minimize current
social inequalities; it is merely an attempt to look beyond them in order to imagine an otherwise
unreachable vision of representative family law.
191. The discussion of these potential systems omits consideration of the means of incor-
porating some important benefits currently granted to many families: for instance, health insur-
ance, tax advantages, social security benefits, and others. The government grants these
privileges to the institutionalized family, yet they are not an essential part of it (as demonstrated
by the existence of legally defined families in other countries which have nationalized health
care systems and public assistance schemes that do not depend upon family membership). Thus
the following proposals assume that these services are not necessarily linked to membership in
recognized family forms. Processes for distributing such benefits may, therefore, be developed
without reference to family ties. For benefits such as health care, it is possible to imagine uni-
versal health systems which would include all persons on an individual basis, but even those
benefits which seem more tightly bound to family relationships may be approached by other
means. There is no reason, for example, that Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Social
Security Act, ch. 531 §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 601-617 (1991)), could not be reconceived so as to focus on economic support of children,
rather than the family ties between the child and adult. Since inequalities in access to such
benefits provide the most focused pressure toward expanding legal definitions of family, this is a
significant omission. However, in order to examine the definitions themselves, we must look
beyond economic necessity to the more theoretical issue of what ought to be considered a famo-
ily. To serve this goal, I create the fiction that certain family-based economic entitlements
which promote extra-family social functions will be met through means which do not currently
exist.
Assuming that services or governmental benefits may be distributed by social programs
without reference to family relationships might seem to obviate the question of why family
definitions are significant in law. However, as noted in Part II, supra, family and law necessar-
ily intersect in a number of areas which do not involve the distribution of economic benefits,
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members of both "traditional" and "alternative" families. This discussion as-
sumes that we are starting at the very beginning. To do so, we must imagine
that categories such as "marriage" and "parenthood" do not exist in law, so
that we can create them in any form we choose.192 And lastly, these explora-
tions are not comprehensive: an exhaustive treatment of the ways in which any
of these plans could be institutionalized is too lengthy and complex to tackle
here.
The proposals are analyzed in two broad categories: (1) how alternative
family systems impact adult partnerships, and (2) how they affect parent-child
relationships. The parent-child relationship must be treated separately be-
cause of children's special needs and demands within a family. Since any sys-
tem dealing with family must ultimately codify both of these types of
relationships, one of the challenges of this project is to bring them together in
an integrated way. Therefore, this discussion first focuses on family relation-
ships generally, particularly as connections between and among adults define
them, and then examines more closely possible legal reconfigurations in the
context of parent-child relationships.
A. Examining Legal Definitions of Partnership
L Expansion of Marriage or Domestic Partnership Laws
One modest means of recognizing non-traditional family forms within the
current legal system would be to permit legislatures and judiciaries to impose
a particular vision of family, but expanding that definition to allow as much
individual choice as possible. Thus, as in Marvin and Braschi, rights and du-
ties now afforded to married partners and to biological and adoptive parents
would be extended to unmarried heterosexual partners, lesbian and gay
couples, nonbiological parents, and so on. Under this model, however, accom-
modation of as many types of "non-traditional" families as possible would
require changes in statutes rather than in case law.
Legislators could achieve such change in several ways. One option is to
legalize marriages which are not currently recognized, such as those between
more than two individuals and/or between same sex partners.1 93 If the state
recognized such marriages, then those members of non-traditional families
who choose to avail themselves of their right to marry would automatically be
such as health care proxies, the supervision of children, and the dissolution of relationships.
Moreover, as long as the law recognizes family relationships in any way, simple justice requires
that all forms of family ought to be recognized equally.
192. If we do not begin from the position of a blank slate, we risk falling into a pattern of
comparing "non-traditional" families with more established norms, thus elevating the latter to
the status of per se legitimacy without conferring the same benefit on newer or less common
types of families. My goal is to avoid this error by beginning with a presumption that all forms
of family are legitimate.
193. Some have suggested that the equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment require legalizing marriage between two partners of the same gender. Fried-
man, supra note 130, at 134.
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granted family status. Alternatively, marriage could shed its civil function
altogether and become a purely private ritual. Such a change would preclude
anyone from attaining automatic "familiness" on the basis of marriage and
would require instead that the state develop and adopt new guidelines for do-
mestic partnership in order to facilitate state recognition of ties among families
of choice.
194
In some ways, these two solutions both achieve the goal of equalizing the
status of established family forms and newer structures, but they arise from
different perspectives and could have widely diverging ramifications. If the
institution of marriage were to become so loosely defined that it would be
capable of including almost any grouping of persons, its usefulness as a ritual-
ized differentiating status might be lost. Indeed, such an expansion blurs into
eliminating marriage from civil consideration altogether.
From a different vantage point, however, opening up the institution of
marriage to a broad range of possible partnership configurations does not ade-
quately address the critique of marriage itself. Many heterosexual couples
currently choose to cohabit rather than to marry, and thus forfeit the privi-
leges that marriage offers within the current system. Although including
many new options within the concept of marriage might introduce a flexibility
which "non-traditional" partners would welcome, a significant portion of such
families still might choose to forgo formalizing their relationships. 195 In addi-
tion to this complication, members of some types of families might not be
eligible to marry even if marriage laws were pushed to their limits. Individu-
als who live together as domestic partners but not within romantic or sexual
relationships can argue convincingly that they should not be excluded from
legal recognition of family relationships merely because their partnerships are
not (or are no longer) sexual. Such relationships could be included within the
rubric of "new marriage," but this expansion helps less than one might ini-
tially assume. On the one hand, we have established that many levels of part-
nership exist, some sexual and/or romantic and others simply domestic and/
or economic. On the other hand, marriage is most often construed as a com-
paratively exclusive romantic connection between individuals. Some individu-
als form domestic partnerships with people with whom they are not sexually
involved, or have only been so in the past, and think of themselves as forming
a committed family with those partners. 196 Marriage could never be expanded
194. This does not suggest that under such a system, marriages would serve no function at
all; in many instances they are important ceremonies with social, emotional, traditional, and
religious significance. However, such social significance need not imply civil distinction as well.
For example, in the United States, no legal ramification exists for Jewish ceremonies of Bar or
Bat Mitzvah, yet few would deny their vitality or importance to the Jewish community.
195. For example, lesbian and gay communities have hotly contested the issue of pressing
for the right to marry. Feminist critiques of marriage as an institution have convinced many
gay activists to favor dismantling the privileges accorded to marital status, rather than ex-
panding the ranks of those eligible for such privilege. See, eg., Ettelbrick, supra note 158, at 9.
196. Here we must distinguish between domestic partners and roommates. While room-
mates have specific obligations to each other, they do not necessarily consider themselves fam-
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enough to cover all domestic partners who considered each other family but
not spouses.
In either case, whether it adopts broad marriage rules or domestic part-
nership rules, this proposal is far from ideal. Though it goes well beyond the
reforms of recent decisions, it does not question the current practice of com-
paring non-traditional families to those models currently recognized by the
courts and society as a whole. It still posits an ultimate (if flexible) definition
of family of choice through the category of "married partner," "domestic
partner," or the equivalent. In order to determine who fits into that category,
statutory law must establish some guidelines or standards to separate those it
designates as partners from those it does not. Given these standards, if a non-
conforming family form arose, the situation we experience now would be re-
peated: either the newly unorthodox family would go unrecognized or it
would have to assimilate into a then-existing model.
A conflict lies at the heart of the question: how can we transfer the power
of definition from external forces to the family itself? We may imagine a con-
tinuum of legal recognition of family forms based on the locus of definition -
that is, who is doing the defining. On one end, the individuals within the
family would be able to determine for themselves, unencumbered by govern-
mental intrusion, who is included in which relationship. At the other extreme
would lie a system in which the state had the authority to decide what com-
prised a family through legislative and judicial action. Our current system
falls nearer to the side that favors state-imposed (in effect, socially-imposed)
norms over free choice by individuals or groups, although exactly where our
present system falls on that spectrum is a debatable point. The question is
thus whether we can create a workable means of addressing family definitions
in law which moves toward self-initiated family definition and away from
comparison to state/society-initiated models.
2. The Privatization of Family Relationships
To begin such an inquiry logically, we must ask whether it is necessary
for government to be involved in family concerns at all. It would be possible
for a social and legal system to completely privatize family relationships. All
people would simply be individuals under the law, with no legal acknowledge-
ment of family ties or obligations. Significant social groupings would be
formed privately, and while they might or might not receive social recogni-
tion, they would be legally irrelevant.
Such a dramatic change in legal structure would require a radical revision
of almost all of our social systems. Since the family in part serves to privatize
the provision of socially essential services, if family ties were not recognized
within the law, the state would probably have to perform these functions. For
ily, or feel committed to maintaining a relationship outside of their formal responsibilities.
Domestic partners, on the other hand, are family: they share a commitment which transcends
their living situation and may include caring for or nurturing each other.
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example, without a universal health care system or other special accommoda-
tions, everyone would have to be involved in the non-familial labor force in
order to obtain health insurance. Thus either outside professional labor would
have to replace the position of private homemaker, or the state would have to
establish a system of wages for housework. Childcare, too, might become a
paid service in many instances, or might be performed by the state. Even if
individuals had the option of caring for children, such care would be based
solely on choice rather than on any obligation of support, and might be subject
to termination or alteration by the state for any number of reasons, since the
state would not recognize any implicit right in the continuation of the child-
caregiver relationship beyond the child's welfare. Additionally, if an individ-
ual died intestate, her property would revert to the state or some other organi-
zation rather than being passed on to legally-recognized family members, since
no specific person or persons would be particularly entitled to inherit the prop-
erty. If an individual were incapacitated to such an extent as to become un-
able to make decisions about her health care and she designated no proxy,
such decisions would have to be handled by state agencies or through some
other public means.
Obviously, because these changes would require drastic shifts in the social
fabric of this country, their impact would go beyond family relations, and
indeed would totally restructure the role of government and social relations.
While many of the changes required might have positive implications, the
ramifications of such far-reaching social upheaval are almost impossible to im-
agine. Moreover, as Francis Olsen points out in her essay The Myth of State
Intervention in the Family, such a notion of complete individualism may be as
much a fiction as that of the nuclear family.19 7 In its enforcement of tort,
contract, criminal, and even constitutional law, the legal system would en-
counter family structures even if it refused to acknowledge them as such.198
Thus, its supposedly family-neutral choices in these areas would nevertheless
impact on persons in family systems, while leaving no room for addressing (or
redressing) that effect. As Olsen argues, the distinction between "interven-
tion" in the family and "nonintervention" is essentially meaningless, since the
law cannot help but make decisions affecting family policy by its inaction as
well as by its action. 9 Thus, the pretense that state intervention in family
can be eliminated or minimized harms, rather than supports, the protection of
family autonomy.
Additionally, a proposal which eliminates legal recognition of family ties
ignores the purpose of law in society generally. If we envision government as
197. Olsen, supra note 120, at 835, 856-58.
198. One example of the intersection between family and criminal law is the prohibitions
against intra-family violence and incest. If family ties were not recognized in this area, the
unique nature of this form of violence, as opposed to assault by a stranger, could not be ad-
dressed in these cases, resulting in what many would perceive as injustice. For an elaboration of
this contention, see id. at 857.
199. Id. at 835.
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a construct designed to facilitate the day-to-day workings of our society, then
we must necessarily consider our legal system a creation of our society rather
than the reverse. That is, our law should serve us, not we it. If law does not
reflect or even acknowledge institutions central to our lives, then it cannot
truly ;erve its role as a social mediator and a protector of social values. There-
fore, unless we were to experience a massive societal shift away from family
living, omitting family ties from the legal system altogether would greatly
limit the effectiveness of law as a social tool.
A final argument against the complete privatization of family ties focuses
on our present social reality. As such experiments in community-controlled
human relations as Israeli kibbutzim have shown, people have a great invest-
ment in family connections. 200 This is particularly true of parent-child bonds.
Psychologists have demonstrated that without the loving care of at least one
adult parental figure, a child will face considerable risk of emotional and de-
velopmental impairment.20 1 Moreover, unless the state alone raises children,
it must recognize the complex connections formed between children and the
people who care for them. Nor can the importance of affectional relationships
among adults be lightly dismissed. Individuals form families to provide for
more than simply material needs; the broadly defined family can fulfill the
strong desire for networks constituting a familiar and supportive environment.
Completely privatizing the family elides our cultural reality and, as such, begs
the difficult question of how to treat families within the law.20 2
Thus if some form of state intervention in the family must exist, the next
questions are how much, and what kind. Moving backward along the contin-
uum of state intervention in family units, the next system we might encounter
would place the initiation of family definition solely with family members
rather than with the state.
3. Individually-Initiated Family Definitions
Simply establishing more open-ended definitions in statutes and the com-
mon law might serve this latter purpose to a limited extent. For example, both
the legislatures and the courts could allow all the members of a family to
define themselves as constituting a familial unit based on their own notions of
what relationships should be considered. Thus if family members felt that
their connections through blood, partnership, or adoption were what defined
them as a family, those ties would be legally recognized. At the same time,
alternative groupings, such as an otherwise unrelated same-sex group of four
200. For a discussion of the development of family life in kibbutzim, see A. RUBIN AND B.
BEIT-HALLAHMI, THIRTY YEARS LATER: KIBBUTZ CHILDREN GROWN Up (1982); Spiro,
supra note 95. See also Y. TALMON, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN THE KIBBUTZ 4-8 (1982).
201. L. HOULGAT, FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY LAW 33 (1988);
see also BEYOND BEST INTERESTS, supra note 113.
202. For a more thorough examination of the impracticality of legal anarchy with respect
to parent-child relationships according to a utilitarian analysis, see L. HOULGATE, supra note
201, at 40-53.
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people, could point to the emotional or economic connections among them
which in their minds constituted the bases for a family. This method, operat-
ing either through case law or statutes, would have to privilege equally all
types of self-defined families.
This system would work well in instances of outside attacks on a relation-
ship such as the one exhibited in Braschi.2°3 However, if the threat to a part-
nership relationship came from within, for example, through disagreement
over family form or over termination of the relationship, such a system would
face difficulties. First, determining the validity of the family would necessitate
judging one person's word against another's. Moreover, the resolution of
some common familial problems, such as estate inheritance, job perks, or med-
ical consents, would require individuals to continually prove their family rela-
tions on demand.
Of course, the assumption implicit in this model is that courts will be able
to approach individual cases with an eye toward examining the unique factors
in each family's situation. However, in order to save time, courts are likely to
develop protocols or look to precedents for certain common predicaments de-
spite this purposeful statutory non-definition. Perhaps they might develop
tests, however informal, to measure levels of family involvement. Doing so
would make the job of the courts easier and might give a greater sense of
overall "justice" than would case-by-case analysis. Yet a shift toward such
court-devised determinations of family ties is necessarily a shift away from the
family's conceptions of its own relationships. Though it is the job of the
courts to make final decisions regarding family membership under this system,
the courts should do so using the family's own criteria, rather than substitut-
ing their judgment. Thus the almost inevitable process of simplifying the
courts' task by creating even flexible general rules cannot help but subvert a
system of self-defining families.
These difficulties inherent in a purely judicially-determined system of
family definition, even one which values individualized and pluralistic notions
of family lead to a different process which would give the power of original
definition back to family members and transform courts solely into mediators
rather than decisionmakers. The mechanism could be a network of (semi-)
standardized declarations of relationship - partnership, parental, dependent,
and so on - submitted by family members.2° With the establishment of a
new relationship, all the adult members involved would draft a declaration,
detailing the nature of the relationship and its rights, privileges, and duties,
and file it with a government agency. The process could be simple. Declara-
tions would be readily available, and relatively uncomplicated forms could
cover different types and levels of relationship. Such declarations could also
203. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Braschi).
204. For an argument that such a system would be preferable to one based on comparison
to the traditional nuclear family, or on case-by-case functional determinations of existing family
ties, see Family Resemblance, supra note 140.
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function as contracts for the length of the relationship, and could be alterable
or amendable at any time with the acceptance of all family members involved.
This system would preempt the state's role in defining family, since the legal
system could be directed to respect any such declarations regardless of con-
tent. Individuals would not have to prove the existence and intensity of their
relationship every time a conflict arose because they already would have deter-
mined it through the declaration process.
Clearly, implementing such a system requires settling a number of ques-
tions. Guidelines would have to determine whether every family member
would have to fie for every other one, even if the relationship were compara-
tively attenuated (for example, great-aunts and -uncles, or relatives by mar-
riage). Would the system take for granted kinship relationships in which all
parties were independent and not necessarily sharing living space, or would
every relationship have to be registered?
The resolution of these issues could take at least two possible forms.
First, since declarations may lie along a continuum of levels of family, we
could construct a system in which kin immediately constitutes a basic level of
relation. Specific heightened kinship relations such as those between siblings
might inhabit intermediate levels if so declared. Otherwise they would fall
into a basic category occupied by all blood relatives.20 5 At the same time,
friendship networks serving an extended family function might be declared to
occupy relational levels equal to or more intense than the basic kin
connections.
An alternate system might eliminate presumptions of family ties. All
members of kinship networks would thus have to be declared on at least some
minimal level in order to qualify as family.20 6 Choice between these two op-
tions depends mainly upon attitudes toward the power of blood ties, and each
creates its own set of problems while solving others. However, both can work
since each recognizes the potential significance of a multilayered extended kin
network, while leaving room for acknowledgement of strong non-kin bonds.
The declaration procedure works best when all parties are independent
adults: the vulnerable position of dependents assumes a great deal of trust and
good faith on the part of the care-giver(s) drafting such a declaration. But
even when all individuals are adults, this procedure is not trouble-free. Essen-
tially it requires a consensus among all participants, not only on the existence
205. For example, an individual might choose to leave most aunts, uncles, and cousins
with whom she had brief or no acquaintance at the first level. She might go on to declare her
parents, siblings, close friends, and other blood relatives with whom she had an especially inti-
mate relationship at some higher level, while designating her relationships with her partner(s)
and children as occupying the highest level. The system might divide relationships horizontally
by kind as well as vertically by intensity. Thus, a distinction might be made between coequal
adult relationships and the fiduciary responsibilities that a parent-child relationship entails.
206. In this circumstance, the situation described in the previous paragraph in text would
be the same, only the individual would also have to file minimal declarations for all the kin she
wanted to include.
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of a relationship but also on the level and kind of relationship. More attenu-
ated family relations are especially problematic, since all members might not
have an opportunity to discuss the declaration at length. Further problems
arise when members of the same family want to file for different levels of rela-
tionship, or when not all members file declarations. Would the highest level of
commitment apply, the lowest, or some compromise between the two? The
state would have to develop some scheme to deal with these kinds of problems
a difficult task, given the complexities of these issues.
Additional difficulties might arise when the state seeks to intervene in the
family in order to prevent abuse or neglect among family members. Accord-
ing to the principles outlined here, new goals might be needed for such legal
intervention. However, none of these proposals should be taken to support the
proposition that family structure may never be altered in order to eradicate
such potential harm. As is presently the case, the criminal law may mandate
such intervention when appropriate. For example, while children would still
be removed from abusive households, the current protocols for placing them
might change to include recognition of currently unacknowledged family ties.
The basic right of the state to protect its citizens from intra-family violence
through the exercise of police power need not be eliminated by a move toward
a more egalitarian system of family definition.
However, there is another societal problem which might render this
mechanism of self definition less powerful and versatile. Many people feel
excluded from the legal system and do not claim the benefits and rights due to
them. Such people might not take full advantage of the flexibility declarations
would provide them or might fear the legal language involved in drafting and
filing a declaration. One way around this widespread anxiety about the inac-
cessibility of legal systems would be to institute a process of yearly declara-
tions similar to the annual filing of income declarations for tax purposes. Just
as the 1040E-Z tax form was developed to simplify the previously mystified
schedules of taxes, and businesses such as H & R Block arose to guide con-
sumers through their tax returns, both governmental and private enterprises
would evolve to make declarations of relationship more stress-free. Moreover,
relationships would become more flexible and possibly more considered if par-
ticipants had to rethink and redeclare them annually.
Though the declaration mechanism appears promising due to its demo-
cratic aspects and potential efficiency, numerous problems could result from
its implementation. The sheer cost of establishing a new government agency
to process millions of relationship forms every year is a major consideration.
As the process of undertaking the 1990 census showed, in such a large project
much information falls through the cracks, many people cannot be contacted,
and bureaucratic mistakes are made.207 If a set of domestic partners needed
207. The 1990 census was widely criticized as underinclusive, particularly among the tra-
ditionally-underacknowledged communities in American culture. See, ag., Dispute Over
Figures Persists, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1991, at 12LI, col. 1; Lost Americans, N.Y. Newsday,
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their declaration and the government agency had misplaced it, would their
relationship simply not exist? Furthermore, this system would not account for
people so removed from the mainstream that the procedure of filing taxes or
declarations of relationship is extremely intimidating.
The most significant problem with any system based on declarations,
however, is the burden imposed by the exact benefit sought to be achieved. If
individuals must take legal action to gain recognition for their families, what
happens if for some reason they don't take such action? Two options seem
apparent: either an absence of declaration could be taken as an absence of
family, or the legal system could recognize undeclared relationships when it
became necessary to do so.
The logic of a system premised on allowing self-determination in defining
family may seem to support the former option, yet such a proposal would be
clearly unjust for a number of reasons. Most significantly, an opportunity for
self-declaration that does not recognize the differing opportunities of many
Americans to take advantage of such a system benefits only a relatively privi-
leged segment of society. Large numbers of people would be unable to pub-
licly declare their family system either because of lack of access to the legal
system or because of social prejudice against their chosen family. In addition,
people might tend to delay acknowledging relationships that do exist, or at
least resist initiating formal recognition of those relationships. Individuals
may not be ready to enter publicly-acknowledged relationships; yet, when con-
fronted with a death, disability, or dissolution, they may realize that those
relationships were sufficiently influential to merit legal consideration.
If their relationships were left with no means of legal recognition whatso-
ever, such individuals would be at an even greater disadvantage than under
the current system, in which at least their more traditional ties are acknowl-
edged. As such, the declaration system in its pure form apparently has the
potential to exclude an enormous number of families; ironically, the families
likely to be excluded would more often than not be those families which the
current system also acknowledges less frequently, that is, families with same-
sex adult partners, or multiple-adult partnerships, and others which face social
condemnation on some fronts.
The alternative, then, is to allow the state to provide back-up rules when,
although there was no formal declaration, family relationships might exist. In
such circumstances, the legal system would have to construct default criteria
for evaluating family relationships where none were publicly documented.
Yet doing so appears to lead right back to the current system of state-initiated
family definition. If we conclude, however, that the state must intervene in the
family to some extent in order to protect undeclared relationships, we must
question the premise of a seamless continuum of state intervention in the fam-
Jan. 2, 1991, Nassau & Suffolk eds., at 44; Half of Project Missed in Count, N.Y. Newsday, Sept.
20, 1990, at 6; Officials Nationwide Heaping Discredit on 1990 Count, Los Angeles Times, Sept.
4, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1072 [Vol. XVIII:1027
DEFINING THE FAMILY
ily. The extremes of the continuum are still evident, but the distinctions
among the intermediate possibilities blur. The declaration proposal began as
an attempt to preempt the state and the legal system from determination of
valid family forms, yet in the end it probably must rely on the state to cover
the gaps left by such a system. This conclusion echoes Francis Olsen's argu-
ment that within our present judicial system some form of state intervention in
the family policy must always exist, and that flexibility in limiting the fre-
quency of such intervention is less possible than it appears at first glance,
2 03
Since the state can affect family policy both by its action in certain circum-
stances and by its failure to act in others, the volume of state intrusion will
vary little.
However, even if implementing a new method of recognizing family defi-
nitions in law will not radically alter the balance between legal supervision of
family forms and family autonomy, alternative systems might still provide tre-
mendous benefits. In a system based on declarations, even if the absence of
declarations required courts to make determinations of family ties, the ability
to avoid legal intervention by using the declaration process would undoubt-
edly benefit countless families which are not currently recognized. Moreover,
the resulting shift in legal values toward individually-initiated family definition
might affect significantly the legal process in those cases in which the legal
system had to make determinations regarding family relationships. The decla-
ration system could incorporate expanded statutory conceptions of potential
family forms, as well as presumptions in favor of supporting family members'
actions which demonstrate their personal notions of family. If the legal sys-
tem incorporated assumptions of family plurality as well as a system of family
self-definition, it would reflect families' conceptions of themselves more fairly
than our current system, even without significantly decreasing the amount of
state intervention in family life.
B. Examining Legal Definitions of Adult-Child Relationships
All the proposed systems discussed above share the assumption that
adults can take responsibility for defining and maintaining their families.
Children, however, are not necessarily able to do either of these things. More-
over, children are in an almost unique position of vulnerability and depen-
dence for many years. How do children fit into a system of self-defining
families?
After our examination above of varying models and levels of family self-
definition, we must explore the incorporation of parent-child relationships into
all of them. Of course, this integration could occur along the lines of restruc-
turing present definitional processes of guardianship, custody, and the like.
Since the partners of a child's biological or adoptive parents, who would not
necessarily have the same biological or adoptive ties to the child, would fulfill
208. Olsen, supra note 120, at 856-58.
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parental roles, some means of recognizing such parents must be incorporated
into this scheme.
1. Expansion.of Parenthood
The first model, which would extend current structures to include alter-
native conceptions of family, would most likely create a system similar to that
already existing in some states. Under such a proposal, the biological or adop-
tive parent(s) would retain currently recognized parental rights and duties.
The only substantial difference would be that these parents could be legally
empowered to designate any number of additional coparents of either gender,
who would also participate in the children's upbringing." These designated
parents, who may or may not also be partners of the child's "primary" par-
ents, would therefore share in childrearing. Alternatively, they might take
over from biological, adoptive, or other coparents in case of extended absence
or temporary inability to care for children, somewhat like temporary foster
parents.
Thus, as Katherine Bartlett argues, the boundaries of parenthood would
expand greatly, since parenthood could no longer be an exclusive status.
210
Moreover, just as different levels of adult relationships could exist, the law
could also allow for varying degrees of parenting. For instance, in addition to
primary care parents, there might be a category of full-time caregivers, or
"quasi-parents," who have visitation rights rather than custody but still main-
tain some interest in the child's welfare. In this system, once an adult-child
relationship has been formed, it must be allowed to continue in its registered
form, even though it may not include full parental decisionmaking and custo-
dial responsibilities. 211 Additional issues to be settled would include: (1)
209. Of course, simple designation might not be enough. We might also require that the
parent so designated actually form a parenting bond (as defined in Beyond Best Interests, supra
note 113) in order to "activate" the designation, to be determined by either the other parents,
the state, or some combination.
210. Bartlett, supra note 184, at 879-83.
211. This assumes that the relationship is beneficial to the child, i.e., is not abusive or
detrimental for other reasons. If a relationship were found to be detrimental, the state or other
co-parents would have the right to terminate or limit the adult's contact with the child. The
most difficult question arises when there is a disagreement among coparents or between
coparents and the state as to what constitutes harm to the child. We might conclude that if
families are to have self determination, then the opinion of a majority of parents, or all parents if
the disagreement is with the government, should be binding. However, we may also conclude
that society would abdicate too much of its responsibility for children's welfare if state agencies
were not allowed to intervene on behalf of children thought to be in danger. Perhaps we might
choose to permit any party interested in the child - that is, any coparent, or any state agent
acting on behalf of society - to call for a hearing if it is alleged that a child is in an abusive or
otherwise harmful relationship. At such a hearing, great weight might be given to the opinions
of all coparents, but ultimately a decision would be rendered by the judiciary.
Such a solution is not radically different from our current legal approach to allegations of
child abuse. With the possibility of more primary and secondary parents comes more poten-
tially abusive relationships, but also a potentially greater number of responsible adults who can
intervene and care for the child. It is possible, then, that there will be less occasion for state
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whether new coparents would have the same rights and responsibilities as the
"original" parents; (2) whether coparents could designate new coparents; (3)
whether parents or coparents could "undesignate" themselves; and (4) what
would happen to the child if the relationships among the adults became con-
tentious or dissolved.
The answer to the first question seems to imply certain logical conclu-
sions to the others. If all coparents are considered equal, then each should be
able to designate new parents. Since each parent assumes responsibility for
the care of the child, if any coparent were allowed to "undesignate" herself, it
would probably have to be with the consent of some or all of the other
coparents, with at least one parent remaining to care for the child. "Divorce"
or dissolution among adult relationships would have to be settled either by
granting joint custody to all coparents or by granting custody to one person or
non-contentious group, and visitation to all others where feasible.
If, on the other hand, new coparents were considered "secondary," it
would follow that they might not be permitted to add new coparents to the
pool. Perhaps secondary parents would be allowed to "undesignate" them-
selves more easily than primary parents, and would be guaranteed only visita-
tion, rather than custody, in the event of a court-mediated dissolution
agreement.
A final scheme might allow new coparents to be considered secondary at
first, but later elevated to primary status should their involvement in the
child's life warrant such recognition. Such relationships exist to some degree
now, albeit mostly informally. Arguments for such changes as the recognition
of stepparent custody discussed in the previous section 12 recognize that the
current legal system could be more flexible in terms of dividing and parceling
out parental rights. Under this system, the state would act in the same capac-
ity that it does currently. Primary parenthood and newly-designated "secon-
dary" parenthood would be recorded by the state, and disputes or crises in the
family would be examined and decided by the courts. In addition, the judici-
ary would determine custody of the child if circumstances warranted it,
though it would have to take into account the importance of continuing
parenting relationships, and should probably grant at least some form of con-
tinued visitation with all primary and secondary parents whenever possible.
2 Individually-Initiated Parenthood Definitions
This system of non-exclusive parenthood might also be incorporated into
a structure that permits greater self-definition, such as the declaration mecha-
nism described above.2"3 Adults would be able legally to designate different
levels of parenthood through a simplified process of filing standardized forms.
intervention, but it seems more likely that if the state is to be involved at all, that it vill end up
taking an active role in mediating and ultimately deciding disputes over allegations of harm.
212. See supra note 170.
213. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1990-91] 1075
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
Such a procedure, however, would have many of the same problems the sys-
tem would exhibit when dealing with adult relationships, problems which
would have heightened significance due to the special needs of children. Since
this proposal negotiates the extremely difficult ground between psychological
("the best interest of the child") and biological parenthood without trying to
codify either standard into law, issues of parental "appropriateness" take on
greater significance. For example, what happens when adults cannot agree
upon their respective levels of parental rights and responsibilities? Of course,
the state could develop categories of parenting into which individuals would
fall. But a more consistent method of resolution would require focusing pri-
marily on the decisions, declarations, and actions of the primary parents, since
in them lies the initial right to designate alternative or additional parents.214
This method will not resolve all conflicts, especially when two previously pri-
mary parents want to gain sole custody. In that case, the courts would have to
decide whether both should share primary parenting (similar to present joint
custody), or if they should have different levels of parenting.215 However, un-
less a parent were unfit to look after the child in any way, no adult who had
established a parenting relationship with the child would be deprived of all
participation in the child's upbringing.
We may also want a system of relationship declaration which recognizes
maturing children's desire to file for themselves. Limits may exist on how old
children must be before they can fie certain declarations such as partnership.
However, just as adults should be entitled to initiate their own understanding
of the family relationships they create, children should be permitted to define
their relational circle and take an increasing responsibility for those connec-
tions as they mature.
As we have seen, strict reliance on either biology or psychology as sole
qualification for custody of children can elide important auxiliary ties and in
fact injure a child's development. Thus, whatever system we implement
would have to make allowances for both biological and emotional connections.
The systems suggested here reserve the initial power of decision-making re-
garding who may become a (co)parent to the adults who first take responsibil-
ity for the child.
214. The original primary parents under this system would be those who originally in-
tended to create and nurture the child, regardless of whether they were biologically related to
her. We might not want to ignore biology completely, however. Perhaps some people, based on
their biological ties would be given an opportunity to develop either a primary or secondary
parenting relationship. Should the potential coparent not avail herself of this opportunity, it
might be considered void after significant amount of time had passed, or the opportunity might
be available until the child reached the age of majority or at least maturity.
215. If coparents were to separate and form new adult partnerships, those new partners
who began to act as either primary or secondary coparents might become designated as such.
As outlined in the previous section, the system might permit any primary parent to designate
new coparents, or might instead require consensus among all coparents, or all primary
coparents.




When the law integrates family into its systems, it does not create a new
sense of what family is; instead, it simply encodes what it sees as "natural"
rights. Through the influence of social scientists such as Talcott Parsons, this
"natural" family came to be understood as one based on the nuclear model -
two married adult partners of opposite genders and their biological or adop-
tive children. Yet the primacy of this model has been exposed as a myth. The
nuclear family is not, and possibly has never been the lived experience of a
majority of Americans, and many people question the traditional roles ex-
pected of its participants.
Nevertheless it is this idealized vision which has shaped legal approaches
to family relationships. The presumed centrality of nuclear family ties neces-
sarily excludes most other possible family structures within the law. An ideal
alternative to this exclusion would require self-definitions of family which
would be respected by the legal system.
However, an entirely individualized, case-by-case definition of family
would be almost impossible to implement. Some sort of outside definition -
either preemptive or after-the-fact - would have to arise to deal with the
difficult conflicts which would inevitably arise and be brought before courts
for resolution. The other alternative is to privatize the family by removing it
from the law completely. But this possibility, through its refusal to acknowl-
edge relationships which are clearly important to their participants, seems to
increase inequities rather than palliate them.
These dilemmas do not mean that the present system of law cannot shift
toward an increased reliance on individual definition of family - that is, to-
ward giving priority to the value and characterization each family takes for
itself. In some ways, changes like the one instituted in Braschi have made
steps toward this goal, though they do not go far enough. The Braschi deci-
sion may open the door for alternative families, but we want to build a new
house altogether.
But how can that house be constructed? Throughout this Note, I have
proposed many options for family law and explored the weaknesses in each.
However, I am aware that I, too, write from a defined perspective. I am not
attempting to set forth a definitive interpretation, but I do believe that through
explorations like the one I have undertaken, legal scholars can begin to under-
stand these issues better and to move toward consensus.
Rather than simply attempting to alter legal protocols, legal scholars and
practitioners need to question legal values and the way those protocols and
values intersect. Of course, within case law, an accumulation of a new set of
values creates precedent for new structures. Braschi is an excellent example of
this. However, the vision here is more complete: we must actively engage the
law to institute a presumed diversity of family forms. Perhaps out of the rec-
ognition of this diversity, new mechanisms will be developed to deal with the
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expanded understandings of "valid" family forms. This is not to say that the
law would organically develop progressive structures to rebuild family law.
On the contrary, these kind of changes require hard work from judges, legisla-
tors, family lawyers, and families themselves. The most important part of this
project will be its insistence upon examining itself and its own motivations. It
continually asks the question left unacknowledged and unrecognized by pres-
ent family law: what is family?
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